Just like for the unsupported/bad exec_fields we should show
a message about what field is bad for service parameters. This
commit adds it using the same pattern. The JSON parser works in
fail-fast mode so we only display the first bad field (and
it depends on the parser what it finds first).
For every built executable, internal shared library, and plugin module,
verify two link-time properties via readelf:
1. No imported GLIBC symbol's version is newer than 2.34.
2. The dynamic section's NEEDED entries reference only glibc, the
runtime linker, our own libraries.
exp10() has a symbol version > 2.34 on latest glibc. To allow
dropping our baseline required glibc runtime version to <= 2.34,
let's add our own version to prevent pulling in the newer symbol
from glibc.
Methods:
- `io.systemd.Job.List` — list all queued jobs or look up by `id`/`unit`
name, with streaming support. Uses context/runtime split: `JobContext`
(Unit, JobType) and `JobRuntime` (Id, State, Result,
ActivationDetails). Follows the same SELinux and parameter-conflict
patterns as `io.systemd.Unit.List`.
- `io.systemd.Job.Cancel` — cancel a specific job by ID, with SELinux
and polkit authorization.
- `io.systemd.Job.ClearAll` — cancel all pending jobs, with SELinux and
polkit authorization.
There exists a small window of time in icmp6_bind() between creating the
ICMPv6 socket and binding it to an ifindex, where the link-scoped socket
can process an ICMPv6 packet received on any interface. The applies to
both sd-radv and sd-ndisc codepaths.
This change adds an explicit check for ifindex on the receive path and
ignores packets received on other interfaces.
Co-developed-by: OpenAI Codex <noreply@openai.com>
`message_skip_fields()` recursively processes D-Bus variant types in
message header fields with no depth limit. A crafted message with deeply
nested variants can cause unbounded recursion and overflow the stack.
Add a `depth` parameter checked against `BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH` (128),
matching the limit already enforced by the public
`sd_bus_message_skip()` API. All recursive call sites pass `depth + 1`,
and the top-level caller in `message_parse_fields()` passes `0`.
The existing error reporting for the varlink `StartTransient` code
was converting all errors into `VARLINK_ERROR_UNIT_BAD_SETTING`.
This is not correct in some cases, we need to have a more targted
pattern here, i.e. only convert EINVAL to VARLINK_ERROR_UNIT_BAD_SETTING
and otherwise return the matching varlink error from the errno instead.
This commit fixes this issue. Thanks to Ivan Kruglov for raising
this.
Each dlopen_*() wrapper kept its dl handle as a file-scope
'static void *xxx_dl = NULL;' even though only the wrapper itself
ever referenced it. Move each one inside the corresponding function
so its scope matches its actual use, leaving the rest of each
translation unit free of the unused file-scope name.
In pcre2-util.c the assert(pcre2_dl) in pattern_matches_and_log()
becomes assert(sym_pcre2_match), which carries the same invariant
(pattern_compile_and_log() ran dlopen_pcre2()).
Commit 881e4717c7 ("test: pin stress-ng --vm-method to a portable
scalar method in TEST-55-OOMD") pinned --vm-method=zero-one with the
rationale that it is "a long-standing scalar method". That rationale is
wrong: stress_vm_zero_one() in stress-ng's stress-vm.c is declared
static size_t TARGET_CLONES stress_vm_zero_one(...)
i.e. it carries the exact same TARGET_CLONES attribute as 33 of the 35
other vm methods. On x86_64 with GCC >=5, TARGET_CLONES expands (see
core-target-clones.h in stress-ng) to a target_clones attribute
including "arch=skylake-avx512", "arch=cooperlake", "arch=tigerlake",
"arch=sapphirerapids", and several other AVX-512-bearing arch variants,
plus "default". GCC generates AVX-512 clones of stress_vm_zero_one() and
the IFUNC resolver picks them on any CPU that advertises AVX-512.
The only vm methods in stress-ng's registry whose function definitions
omit TARGET_CLONES entirely (and are therefore guaranteed not to
dispatch to an AVX-512 clone) are lfsr32 (portable, always registered)
and write64ds (x86_64-only, gated on HAVE_ASM_X86_MOVDIRI, i.e. Intel
Tremont / Tiger Lake+ MOVDIRI instruction).
Switch the four stress-ng --vm invocations in TEST-55-OOMD to
--vm-method=lfsr32 so the AVX-512 SIGILL on CPUs without AVX-512 (e.g.
AMD Zen 1-3) can no longer occur regardless of compiler version,
optimization level, or stress-ng package build.
Follow-up for 881e4717c7
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test waited for the OnFailure= service's filesystem side effect
(`rmdir` of the directory) and then immediately invoked
`systemctl is-active`. Between `rmdir(2)` returning (which causes the
shell loop to exit) and PID1 reaping the child and transitioning the
oneshot service from `activating` to `active`, there is a small window
where `is-active` can observe `activating` and fail the test.
Wait directly on the unit state instead, matching the pattern used a
few lines above for the `is-failed` case.
[ 1880.326704] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21489]: + timeout --foreground 60 bash -c 'while [[ -d '\''/tmp/TEST-07-PID1-socket-8467/test'\'' ]]; do sleep .5; done'
[ 1880.330482] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21489]: + [[ ! -e /tmp/TEST-07-PID1-socket-8467/test ]]
[ 1880.330482] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21489]: + systemctl is-active TEST-07-PID1-socket-OnFailure.service
[ 1880.347470] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21520]: activating
[ 1880.349508] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21489]: + at_exit
[ 1880.349508] TEST-07-PID1.sh[21489]: + systemctl stop TEST-07-PID1-socket-8467.socket
[ 1880.367331] TEST-07-PID1.sh[107]: Subtest /usr/lib/systemd/tests/testdata/units/TEST-07-PID1.socket-on-failure.sh failed
[ 1880.367331] TEST-07-PID1.sh[107]: + return 1
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Craft a raw D-Bus message with an unknown header field containing
BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH+1 nested variants and verify that message parsing
rejects it with -EBADMSG rather than recursing until stack overflow.
message_skip_fields() recurses for each nested variant ('v') type in
D-Bus message header fields. A crafted message with deeply nested
variants (e.g., a variant containing a variant containing a variant...)
causes unbounded stack growth, leading to stack overflow and crash.
Add a depth parameter that increments on each recursive call and
rejects messages exceeding BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH with -EBADMSG. This
matches the existing depth limits enforced elsewhere in the sd-bus
message processing (e.g., bus_message_enter_container).
meson test --wrapper hook to print a gdb backtrace inline in the test
log when a test exits with an actual crash signal (SIGSEGV, SIGABRT,
SIGBUS, SIGFPE, SIGILL). Wired into the default add_test_setup() so it
runs automatically on every `meson test`.
Environmental terminations (SIGTERM/SIGKILL/SIGPIPE/SIGALRM) are passed
through without replay, and the original signal is re-raised so the
parent's wait() observes WIFSIGNALED rather than a plain exit code.
as specified by the haproxy documentation:
https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
only protocol v1 is implemented for now, protocol v2 is binary,
and will be implemented in the future.
the proxy protocol allows the destination/target to know the
address/port of the client connectiing.
in nginx it's supported by enabling the `proxy_protocol` parameter to
the `listen` directive.
Each dlopen_*() wrapper kept its dl handle as a file-scope
'static void *xxx_dl = NULL;' even though only the wrapper itself
ever referenced it. Move each one inside the corresponding function
so its scope matches its actual use, leaving the rest of each
translation unit free of the unused file-scope name.
In pcre2-util.c the assert(pcre2_dl) in pattern_matches_and_log()
becomes assert(sym_pcre2_match), which carries the same invariant
(pattern_compile_and_log() ran dlopen_pcre2()).
Some drivers (currently mlx5_core) expose sub-functions (SFs) of a PCI
Physical or Virtual Function as auxiliary devices that carry a stable
`sfnum` sysfs attribute (the user-defined SF number passed to `devlink
port add ... sfnum N`). Their leaf devices (net, infiniband, ...)
currently inherit the parent PF/VF's `ID_PATH` and the SF netdev falls
through to the kernel-assigned `eth<N>` name.
Two patches:
1. `udev-builtin-path_id`: prepend an `sf-<N>` token when the walk
crosses an aux device with `sfnum`, so SF leaf devices get an `ID_PATH`
distinct from the parent PF/VF (e.g. `pci-0000:c1:00.0-sf-88`). Aux
devices without `sfnum` keep the pre-patch behaviour, so existing
`ID_PATH` values are unchanged and the patch needs no naming-scheme gate
(path_id is unversioned).
2. `udev-builtin-net_id`: name SF host netdevs analogously to SR-IOV VF
host netdevs — walk to the parent PCI function and append a
single-character `S<sfnum>` suffix. SFs hosted on SR-IOV VFs (VF-SF) get
both suffixes chained on the PF's base name (`enp193s0f0v0S88`). Gated
behind `NAMING_SUBFUNC` / `NAMING_V261`. Man page
(`systemd.net-naming-scheme(7)`) updated.
The patches apply to any driver that exposes its SF leaf devices below
an aux device exposing `sfnum`.
Validated on mlx5 hardware: PF, VF, SF-on-PF (`enp8s0f0S88`,
`pci-0000:08:00.0-sf-88`). VF-SF case verified with a fake-sysfs setup
since this is not supported by any real device and is more a theoretical
use case.
* 77fce77807 apk: Implement repository_key_fetch for the postmarketOS distribution
* 7068ed49ab postmarketos: Add ruff to tools tree
* dea4b6bfc8 Add newline when writing machine id into /etc/machine-id
* 944b775d40 tools: add libtss2-tcti-device0 to opensuse tools tree
* d856d65d3b mkosi-initrd: Also add cryptsetup-libs explicitly to the initrd
* 1cc967c5b3 mkosi-initrd: Trim orphaned GPU/audio modules, add ACPI platform attrs
* a3e95a7c29 mkosi-tools: Add fish to misc profile
* 76b02d1f84 mkosi-tools: Add jujutsu to misc profile
* 0afe4cd254 mkosi-tools: Move gh to misc profile
* 9077634bad mkosi-tools: Add cryptsetup-libs to centos/fedora/opensuse
* 82846347af box: Drop background tinting
* 3e50b97101 mkosi-tools: Add libfido2
* 78c2784827 vmspawn: Use --ephemeral rather than copy_ephemeral()
* dc801b00a3 Added second call to update kerneltype after kernel is defined
* 0c5cc04a8b vmspawn: Forward journal-remote settings to vmspawn
* 2518468c65 nspawn: Use --forward-journal instead of running journal-remote ourselves
* d2b798d00c apk: skip removal of packages that aren't installed
Since [0] and [1] questions & answer RRs from the incoming packets are
parsed into a hashmap to speed things up. The hashmaps are even
pre-allocated to speed things up even more, but there's one caveat - the
size for the pre-allocation comes from one or more fields from the
incoming packets that are under sender's control.
This can be abused by a malicious DNS server which can send a packet
with a spoofed QDCOUNT (for question packets) or ANCOUNT/NSCOUNT/ARCOUNT
(for answer packets). The limit of the final value in both cases is 64K.
This value is then used to pre-allocate the hashmap (via
set_reserve()/ordered_set_reserve(), where the caller also multiplies
the input value by 2 in both cases), which in turns calls
resize_buckets() that memzero()s the pre-allocated area, so all the
pages are faulted in, showing in process' RSS. Each such spoofed packet
then can translate into a ~4 MiB allocation in the systemd-resolved
process, which doesn't sound that bad.
However, this can be further amplified if the spoofed packet ends up in
resolved's cache. So, if the spoofed packet contains one valid A record
and then an OPT record with a spoofed ARCOUNT, the whole packet ends up
in the cache that can hold 4K of entries, which can eventually cause
resolved to keep up to 16 GiB of memory just for the cache (and thanks
to the memzero() above it's all RSS). Note that all this requires
someone with enough privileges to configure resolved to actually point
to such malicious DNS server or it could come from a malicious DHCP
server on the network. This could also get exploited via LLMNR, but in
thas case an attacker would have to match an ID of a valid transaction
for the packet to end up in resolved's cache.
For example, with a malicious DNS already in resolved configuration:
$ resolvectl dns eth0
Link 2 (eth0): 192.168.99.1:5354
Filling resolved's cache:
$ for i in {0..4200}; do resolvectl query test-$i.example.com; done
...
test-4200.example.com: 192.0.2.1 -- link: dummy0
-- Information acquired via protocol DNS in 1.6ms.
-- Data is authenticated: no; Data was acquired via local or encrypted transport: no
-- Data from: network
Yields following memory increase:
$ while :; do grep VmRSS /proc/$(pidof systemd-resolved)/status; sleep 1; done
VmRSS: 14280 kB
VmRSS: 14280 kB
...
VmRSS: 403352 kB
VmRSS: 1017976 kB
VmRSS: 1603876 kB
VmRSS: 2202028 kB
...
VmRSS: 16795724 kB
VmRSS: 16795724 kB
In my testing I also noticed one annoyance - after certain threshold the
RSS increase persisted even after the malicious entries were evicted
from the cache (or flushed via `resolvectl flush-caches`). This was most
likely due to mmap_threshold getting bumped to > 4 MiB and neither cache
eviction nor flush-caches call malloc_trim(0) (via
sd_event_trim_memory() or similar).
To mitigate this, let's cap the pre-allocation to a maximum number of
records the given packet body can realistically contain. If the minimum
size would be, for whatever unlikely reason, not enough, nothing serious
would happen - the hashmap would still get resized automatically by
resize_buckets(), it'd be just slightly slower.
[0] ae45e1a383
[1] 2d34cf0c16
Add COREDUMP_CODE to the fields captured by systemd-coredump. This makes
it possible for system administrators to filter coredumps based on si_code,
which describes the reason why a given signal was sent.
For example, to find processes killed due to invalid permissions
(SEGV_ACCERR):
$ journalctl COREDUMP_SIGNAL=11 COREDUMP_CODE=2
I've decided to add the value of si_code to the 'Signal: ' line of
coredumpctl info:
Signal: 11 (SEGV) si_code: SEGV_ACCERR
Allow users to allow DHCPv6 unreachable/blackhole routes (installed
for delegated prefixes) into a specific routing table, analogous to
the existing RouteTable= in [DHCPv4] and [IPv6AcceptRA].
The config parser config_parse_dhcp_or_ra_route_table() is extended
with an AF_UNSPEC ltype discriminator for DHCPv6 (AF_INET6 is already
taken by NDISC/RA). link_get_dhcp6_route_table() follows the same
pattern as link_get_dhcp4_route_table() and link_get_ndisc_route_table(),
falling back to the VRF table when not explicitly set.
In dhcp_request_unreachable_route(), the table is applied only for
NETWORK_CONFIG_SOURCE_DHCP6 routes (the uplink unreachable aggregates),
not DHCP_PD routes (per-subnet routes on downstream interfaces), matching
the intent of the feature. The !route->table_set guard avoids overriding
a table already set by the route code.
The stress-ng "vm" stressor's default --vm-method=all cycles through every
VM stress method, including newer ones that use AVX-512 instructions. On
CPUs without AVX-512 support (e.g. AMD Zen 1 to 3) those methods crash with
SIGILL. In testcase_oom_rulesets_lasting_sec all 10 stress-ng workers die
within ~2.34 seconds, so by the time the 6 second sleep elapses the unit
is already in failed/exit-code state and the assert_eq for
ActiveState=active trips.
Pin --vm-method=zero-one, a long-standing scalar method, on all four
stress-ng --vm invocations in this test (the two transient services in
testcase_oom_rulesets and testcase_oom_rulesets_lasting_sec, plus
TEST-55-OOMD-testbloat.service and TEST-55-OOMD-testmunch.service) so the
workers do not crash on AVX-512-less CPUs. testbloat, testmunch and
testcase_oom_rulesets have not been observed failing because they get
OOM-killed by systemd-oomd within ~1 to 2 seconds, before stress-ng cycles
into an AVX-512 method, but they share the same latent flake.
Journal excerpts from the failing run, TEST-55-OOMD-slowrule.service in
testcase_oom_rulesets_lasting_sec (journalctl -o short-monotonic):
[ 58.018676] stress-ng[1015]: invoked with '/usr/bin/stress-ng --timeout 15s --vm 10 --vm-bytes 50M --vm-keep' by user 0 'root'
[ 59.866072] stress-ng[1030]: stress-ng: debug: [1030] caught SIGILL, address 0x000055bd8d609140 (ILL_ILLOPN)
[ 59.921050] stress-ng[1030]: stress-ng: debug: [1030] stress-ng: info: 0x000055bd8d609140:<62>71 fd 48 6f 2d 36 14 1c 00 c5 d1 ef ed 49 29
[ 59.929310] stress-ng[1015]: stress-ng: error: [1015] vm: [1021] terminated with an error, exit status=2 (stressor failed)
[ 60.364111] stress-ng[1015]: stress-ng: info: [1015] failed: 10: vm (10)
[ 60.364493] stress-ng[1015]: stress-ng: info: [1015] unsuccessful run completed in 2.34 secs
[ 60.371290] systemd[1]: TEST-55-OOMD-slowrule.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=2/INVALIDARGUMENT
[ 60.371396] systemd[1]: TEST-55-OOMD-slowrule.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
[ 64.017061] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[1010]: + assert_eq failed active
[ 64.018167] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[1039]: FAIL: expected: 'active' actual: 'failed'
The faulting bytes marked by stress-ng with <62> (the byte at the
instruction pointer) decode unambiguously to an AVX-512 VMOVDQA64 using
the 512-bit zmm13 register, confirmed independently by two disassemblers:
$ printf '\x62\x71\xfd\x48\x6f\x2d\x36\x14\x1c\x00' | ndisasm -b 64 -
00000000 6271FD486F2D3614 vmovdqa64 zmm13,zword [rel 0x1c1440]
-1C00
$ echo '0x62, 0x71, 0xfd, 0x48, 0x6f, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x14, 0x1c, 0x00' | \
llvm-mc -disassemble -triple=x86_64 -mattr=+avx512f
.text
vmovdqa64 1840182(%rip), %zmm13
The leading 0x62 is the EVEX prefix (exclusive to AVX-512 on this target),
zmm13 is a 512-bit register that only exists when AVX-512 is implemented,
and VMOVDQA64 requires the AVX512F (Foundation) CPUID feature (Intel SDM
Vol 2C). Executing this on a CPU without AVX-512 raises #UD, delivered by
the kernel as SIGILL/ILL_ILLOPN, matching the journal entry above. The
same journal shows the kernel reporting "kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported",
i.e. the guest is on AMD KVM, and AMD did not ship AVX-512 before Zen 4.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The current key sealing format has some less-than-ideal weaknesses:
- PBKDF2 with only 65k iterations, where recommendations are ~200k
- AES with null IV, relying on salt for uniqueness
- lack of AES MAC/AEAD
However improbable, it is at least theorically possible that with
a lot of resources an offline bruteforce could be attempted.
Add a v2 sealing format, keeping unsealing compatibility with
the current format:
`v2:<iterations>:<salt>:<IV>:<ciphertext>:<aes tag>`
and use 600k iterations for the PBKDF2 sha512
Some drivers (currently mlx5_core) expose sub-functions (SFs) of a PCI
Physical Function as auxiliary devices. Each SF carries a host network
interface that sits below the aux device in sysfs:
/sys/devices/.../<PF BDF>/mlx5_core.sf.<idx>/net/eth<N>
Because the network device's immediate parent is the aux device and not
a PCI device, names_pci() bails out and these interfaces fall through
to the kernel-assigned eth<N> name, which is not stable across reboots,
module reloads or topology changes.
The naming applies when the SF network device's direct sysfs parent is
the aux device that exposes sfnum, i.e. the kernel driver passes the
aux device to SET_NETDEV_DEV(). mlx5_core does so. ice's
ice_sf_cfg_netdev() currently passes the parent PF's PCI device, so ice
SF network devices sit as siblings of the PF rather than below the aux
device and fall outside this precondition; pending a kernel change in
ice to mirror mlx5's SET_NETDEV_DEV(netdev, &adev->dev), they continue
to receive the kernel-assigned name as they do today.
The aux device exposes 'sfnum', the user-defined sub-function number
(the value passed to "devlink port add ... sfnum N"), which is stable
and unique within its parent PF. The aux device's direct sysfs parent
is the PF's PCI device.
Treat an SF host network device analogously to an SR-IOV VF host
network device: walk to the parent PCI function, derive the base name
from there, then append a single-character "S<sfnum>" suffix. Lowercase
's' is already taken (slot) and the existing grammar uses one character
per token, so 'S' is the best option.
E.g. for an SF whose parent PF is at PCI 0000:c1:00.0 and which was
added with "sfnum 88":
ID_NET_NAME_PATH=enp193s0f0S88
ID_NET_NAME_SLOT=enp193s0f0S88
This is parallel to how SR-IOV VFs get a "v<N>" suffix on top of the
parent PF's name.
Gate the new behaviour behind NAMING_SUBFUNC and NAMING_V261. Document
the new suffix in both the ID_NET_NAME_SLOT and ID_NET_NAME_PATH
grammars in systemd.net-naming-scheme(7) and add a v261 history entry.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Some drivers expose sub-functions (SFs) of a PCI Physical or Virtual
Function as auxiliary devices that carry a stable 'sfnum' sysfs
attribute — the user-defined sub-function number (e.g. the value
passed to "devlink port add ... sfnum N"). The SF's leaf devices
(uverbs, infiniband, net, ...) sit below this aux device in sysfs:
/sys/devices/.../<PF or VF BDF>/<sf aux>/.../<leaf>
Currently path_id walks straight past the aux device, so all leaf
devices below an SF end up sharing ID_PATH=pci-<BDF> with their
parent PF or VF. For uverbs this causes a /dev/infiniband/by-path/
symlink collision, and for any other consumer of ID_PATH/ID_PATH_TAG
it makes PF and SF (or VF and VF-SF) indistinguishable.
Recognise the 'auxiliary' subsystem in path_id's walk: when the aux
device exposes 'sfnum', prepend an 'sf-<N>' token; otherwise leave
it untokenised. The result for an SF whose parent PF is at PCI
0000:c1:00.0 and which was added with "sfnum 88" is:
ID_PATH=pci-0000:c1:00.0-sf-88
ID_PATH_TAG=pci-0000_c1_00_0-sf-88
This is parallel to how net_id's NAMING_SUBFUNC scheme appends 'S<N>'
on top of the PF base name. Aux devices without 'sfnum' keep the
pre-patch behaviour: the walk skips over them with no token. Existing
ID_PATH values for PF and VF leaf devices are therefore unchanged,
the change is purely additive, and there is no need to gate it behind
a naming scheme (path_id itself is unversioned).
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The current key sealing format has some less-than-ideal weaknesses:
- PBKDF2 with only 65k iterations, where recommendations are ~200k
- AES with null IV, relying on salt for uniqueness
- lack of AES MAC/AEAD
However improbable, it is at least theorically possible that with
a lot of resources an offline bruteforce could be attempted.
Add a v2 sealing format, keeping unsealing compatibility with
the current format:
v2:<iterations>:<salt>:<IV>:<ciphertext>:<aes tag>
and use 600k iterations for the PBKDF2 sha512
Filesystems like xfs, btrfs, gfs2 and ocfs2 handle quotas internally
and do not need external quotacheck/quotaon services. When usrquota or
grpquota mount options are used in fstab for these filesystems,
generator_hook_up_quotacheck() falls through to the !fstype_needs_quota()
branch and emits a misleading warning that quotas are "not supported"
when they actually work fine — the kernel handles them internally.
Add fstype_has_internal_quota() to return early with a debug message,
and adopt a tri-state return convention so the caller skips quotaon
when quotacheck was not needed.
The buggy code path was introduced in #24824 and #24880.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split the monolithic varlinkctl test script into separate files per varlink interface for better organization and easier maintenance:
- varlinkctl.sh: core varlinkctl tool tests (CLI, transports, socket discovery, upgrade/serve) and io.systemd.Manager
- varlinkctl-network.sh: io.systemd.Network
- varlinkctl-unit.sh: io.systemd.Unit (system + user manager)
- varlinkctl-metrics.sh: io.systemd.Metrics
No functional changes — the test content is moved as-is.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Michael Vogt
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
Patrick Rohr
Luca Boccassi
TristanInSec
Дамјан Георгиевски
Frantisek Sumsal
Nandakumar Raghavan
dependabot[bot]
Temuri Doghonadze
Marek Adamski
Yuri Chornoivan
Luna Jernberg
Américo Monteiro
Oğuz Ersen
Lennart Poettering
Jiri Pirko
Vincent Mihalkovic
Ivan Kruglov
