The warning will still be reported if XAUTHORITY is set but not exported.
However, such scenario is unlikely for xinitrc.d scripts environment.
Fixes#40745
Signed-off-by: Dmytro Bagrii <dimich.dmb@gmail.com>
Follow-up to 02cab70acf. pe_hash(),
section_offset_cmp() and uki_hash() still had a bunch of raw accesses
to LE fields (e_lfanew, SizeOfHeaders, PointerToRawData, SizeOfRawData,
VirtualSize, certificate_table->Size) without le32toh(), so they'd
produce garbage on big-endian.
Also wrap VirtualSize in bootspec.c for consistency.
This was made a strv to handle either directories or raw images but
since we now handle that via multiple PickFilter instances, we don't
need suffixes to be a strv anymore.
Fixes failure on Rawhide:
TEST-88-UPGRADE.sh[512]: Transaction failed: Rpm transaction failed.
TEST-88-UPGRADE.sh[512]: Warning: skipped OpenPGP checks for 15 packages from repository: @commandline
TEST-88-UPGRADE.sh[512]: - package systemd-shared-260~devel-20260218150812.fc45.x86_64 does not verify: no signature
You can register whatever process you want in the user machined instance
that is running in the same namespace as pid 1 as machined won't be allowed
to do anything privileged anyway that could be dangerous when running as a user
instance.
We have to skip the check as we user machined instances don't have
privileges to inspect pid1's user namespaces.
Set `persist-credentials: false` for actions/checkout.
By default, using `actions/checkout` causes a credential to be persisted on
disk. Subsequent steps may accidentally publicly persist the credential, e.g.
by including it in a publicly accessible artifact via actions/upload-artifact.
However, even without this, persisting the credential on disk is non-ideal
unless actually needed.
Link: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#artipacked
By default, Dependabot does not perform any cooldown on dependency updates.
In other words, a regularly scheduled Dependabot run may perform an update
on a dependency that was just released moments before the run began.
This presents both stability and supply-chain security risks.
To mitigate these risks, explicitly set Dependabot cooldown period to 7 days.
Link: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#dependabot-cooldown
Otherwise, OOM error will never checked, and the "preferred" setting
always emits warning that the field is unknown.
Follow-up for 450e0dce02.
Fixes CID#1645063.
ID_INTEGRATION is not being updated with hwdb entries, asign the new
value to it when hwdb has been imported.
We still need the 65-integration.rule assignment for devices that aren't
in hwdb.
While at it remove unneeded check in 70-touchpad.rules, as it was not
added for 70-joystick.rules with the statement if ID_INPUT_* is set and
ID_INPUT not, there is a bug elsewhere. And remove unneeded gotos in
both files.
Follow-up for a4381cae8b.
pe_hash() and uki_hash() pass pe_header->pe.NumberOfSections directly
to typesafe_qsort() and FOREACH_ARRAY() without le16toh(). On
big-endian (s390x), NumberOfSections=3 gets read as 0x0300 (768),
while pe_load_sections() correctly converts it and only allocates 3
sections. This makes qsort process 768 elements on a 3-element
buffer, causing a heap-buffer-overflow (confirmed with ASAN on
native s390x).
Wrap all three raw usages with le16toh() to match pe_load_sections().
As in the previous commit, also enable the measurement logic when
activating Verity via veritsetup rather than the dissection logic.
The logic stays close to the interface of cryptsetup for measuring the
volume key.
Let's hook up the dissection logic with the new measurement infra, and
issue the measurement after successfully unlock an image, but before
returning to the caller.
Note that ideally we'd do this measurement in the kernel, so that we can
place it after authenticating the root hash, but before activating the
medium. One day we should be able to do that via eBPF based on userspace
policies, but for now, this would require too much kernel rework.
Let's however make sure our measurements only contain data that the
kernel could know too, so that we hopefully can move these measurements
to the kernel without changing their formatting.
This adds infrastructure for measuring Verity root hashes from
userspace, along with he issuer/serial of the signatures used to unlock
them.
We measure the triplet of volume name, root hash and issuer/serial. if
confext/sysext use different signing keys then this ensures the event
log carry information about the type of image measures.
Once we start measuring Verity volumes as we activate them we want to
include information about the signature keys used, so that we can have
distinct ones for confext and for sysext and ther purposes and thus have
a cryptograpically protected hint about the kind of image we have
activated in the event log.
Ideally we'd measure a fingerprint of the signing certificate here, but
we don't have that here typically (as PKCS7 signatures used here
typically do not embed that), hence use the next best thing: the issuer
name and the serial number.
I thnk it's crucial we start to measure Verity images as we activate
them, so that the event log has a full trace of the compisition of the
system. hence let's introduce a new NvPCR for this purpse, under the
name "verity".
It think we should move most measurements out of the individual tools
requesting them and into the pcrextend service via Varlink, so that
fewer components require access to the TPM.
This only works however, if we can actually write full-blown event log
records via this mechanism, and for that we still were missing access to
the userspace event type we insert into the event log. Add that.