At that point the options have been parsed, sent and received again so
`ndisc_parse_options` should never fail there (unless ndisc_send corrupts
them somehow).
It's a follow-up to https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31807
It should turn on the "restricted" mode by default regardless of
whether the global setting is on or not. New jobs in this action
should have to overwrite it explicitly to gain write access in any
way.
It should also make the action consistent with the other actions
writing various stuff like 'labeler' and 'codeql'.
This reverts commit 0bd292567a.
It isn't guaranteed anywhere that __builtin_dynamic_object_size can
always deduce the size of every object passed to it so systemd
can end up using either malloc_usable_size or
__builtin_dynamic_object_size when pointers are passed around,
which in turn can lead to actual segfaults like the one mentioned in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23619.
Apparently __builtin_object_size can return different results for
pointers referring to the same memory as well but somehow it hasn't
caused any issues yet. Looks like this whole
malloc_usable_size/FORTIFY_SOURCE stuff should be revisited.
Closes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23619 and
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23150.
Reopens https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22801
Some compiler wrappers like honggfuzz pass -fno-builtin explicitly
and because of that the tests where fabs is used fail to compile
with something like
```
FAILED: test-bus-marshal
...
/usr/bin/ld: test-bus-marshal.p/src_libsystemd_sd-bus_test-bus-marshal.c.o: undefined reference to symbol 'fabs@@GLIBC_2.2.5'
/usr/bin/ld: /usr/lib64/libm.so.6: error adding symbols: DSO missing from command line
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
```
Fun fact: it took honggfuzz less than a minute to discover
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gmc7-pqv9-966m used by
systemd to compress/descompress some stuff.
```
timedatectl list-timezones --no-pager
...
==164329==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 8192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fe8a74b6f8c in reallocarray (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0xaef8c)
#1 0x7fe8a63485dc in strv_push ../src/basic/strv.c:419
#2 0x7fe8a6349419 in strv_consume ../src/basic/strv.c:490
#3 0x7fe8a634958d in strv_extend ../src/basic/strv.c:542
#4 0x7fe8a643d787 in bus_message_read_strv_extend ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5606
#5 0x7fe8a643db9d in sd_bus_message_read_strv ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5628
#6 0x4085fb in list_timezones ../src/timedate/timedatectl.c:314
#7 0x7fe8a61ef3e1 in dispatch_verb ../src/shared/verbs.c:103
#8 0x410f91 in timedatectl_main ../src/timedate/timedatectl.c:1025
#9 0x41111c in run ../src/timedate/timedatectl.c:1043
#10 0x411242 in main ../src/timedate/timedatectl.c:1046
#11 0x7fe8a489df1f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x40f1f)
```
The idea was to catch CFLite regressions but since the action itself
pulls the latest docker images it can't be pinned properly and issues
like https://github.com/google/clusterfuzzlite/issues/91 are going to
pop up anyway. Let's unpin it by analogy with CIFuzz and hope it doesn't
break very often.
mostly to make sure that systemd is buildable without some dependencies
but other than that it should make it easier to build it with MSan without
having to compile all the dependencies with MSan.
It should make it easier to figure out what exactly services do there.
For example, with SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug userdbd (v249) prints
```
varlink-5: New incoming message: {"method":"io.systemd.UserDatabase.GetUserRecord","parameters":{}}
```
before it crashes and systemd-resolved prints
```
varlink-21: New incoming message: {"method":"io.systemd.Resolve.ResolveAddress","parameters":{"address":[127,0,0,1],"flags":0,"ifindex":1000000,"family":0}}
```
and those messages are helpful (especially when scripts causing them
aren't clever enough to keep track of random stuff they send to systemd
:-))
CIFuzz has been kind of broken for a couple months because
coverage reports downloaded from OSS-Fuzz contain absolute
paths while paths to files changed in PRs are relative and they
don't match. It makes it kind of hard for CIFuzz to figure out
what it should run so it runs either all fuzz targets or just new
fuzz targets. Until that issue is fixed let's just always predictably run
all fuzz targets.
when they go down resolved prints
```
Event source mdns-ipv4 (type io) returned error, disabling
```
instead of
```
Event source n/a (type io) returned error, disabling
```
Judging by
ERROR! Failed to call GitHub Status API!
it doesn't seem to work. Even if it did it would just clutter the status
checks I think so let's just remove MULTI_STATUS along with
GITHUB_TOKEN.
some actions like Coverity and CFLite aren't run on every PR so to make
sure they are more or less fine when they are changed it makes sense to
at least check them with superlinter/actionlint: https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint
The following warnings were fixed along the way:
```
.github/workflows/mkosi.yml:55:7: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:6:14: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting [shellcheck]
|
55 | run: |
| ^~~~
.github/workflows/mkosi.yml:55:7: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:6:40: Quote this to prevent word splitting [shellcheck]
|
55 | run: |
| ^~~~
.github/workflows/mkosi.yml:55:7: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2006:style:6:40: Use $(...) notation instead of legacy backticked `...` [shellcheck]
|
55 | run: |
| ^~~~
```
```
.github/workflows/coverity.yml:31:9: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:1:93: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting [shellcheck]
|
31 | run: echo "COVERITY_SCAN_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL=$(git log -1 ${{ github.sha }} --pretty=\"%aE\")" >> $GITHUB_ENV
| ^~~~
```
to let them use reproducible identifiers, which should make it possible
to really use files copied from OSS-Fuzz to reproduce issues on
GHActions and locally. Prompted by https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/22365
It's a follow-up to https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10200 where
that fuzzer was introduced. At the time it was run regularly on machines
where machine-id wasn't present so it was kind of reproducible. Now
it's run on CIFuzz and CFLite using GHActions with the public OSS-Fuzz
corpora (based on that particular machine-id) so to fully utilize
those corpora it's necessary to use it always. Other than that
it makes it possible for fuzzers targeting outgoing packets
based on incoming packets like https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1795921
to get past client_parse_message on my machine :-)
The idea behind this action is to make it possible to compare the
latest fuzz targets with PRs to figure out whether bugs are really
reproducible in PRs only. Since forks (including systemd-stable) are
usually based on the upstream repository where almost all the bugs
are fixed before releases are cut it should be safe to assume that
if CFLite finds bugs in PRs they are most likely introduced in those
PRs.
It should probably be brought back once https://github.com/google/clusterfuzzlite/issues/84
is fixed.
It's like CIFuzz but unlike CIFuzz it's compatible with forks and
it should make it possible to run the fuzzers to make sure that
patches backported to them are backported correctly without introducing
new bugs and regressions.
Turns out that part of systemd isn't covered by any fuzz targets and
that's not ideal considering that it parses data sent remotely. The
fuzzer triggers an infinite loop in lease_parse_routes as soon as it
starts so it seems to be working :-)
```
INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 23620602
INFO: Loaded 2 modules (182073 inline 8-bit counters): 176548 [0x7fdf511fc8d0, 0x7fdf51227a74), 5525 [0x5f6ef0, 0x5f8485),
INFO: Loaded 2 PC tables (182073 PCs): 176548 [0x7fdf51227a78,0x7fdf514d94b8), 5525 [0x5f8488,0x60ddd8),
./build/fuzz-dhcp-client: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: test/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp-client/timeout-ed34161922c7075c4773f2ada3dee8685d220980
ALARM: working on the last Unit for 31 seconds
and the timeout value is 30 (use -timeout=N to change)
==80731== ERROR: libFuzzer: timeout after 31 seconds
#0 0x51b32e in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x51b32e)
#1 0x4689e9 in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x4689e9)
#2 0x44a0f4 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticAlarmCallback() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a0f4)
#3 0x7fdf4f8b474f (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x4274f)
#4 0x465fee in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x465fee)
#5 0x57eee5 in lease_parse_routes /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:495:23
#6 0x57baf3 in dhcp_lease_parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:701:21
#7 0x572450 in parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:348:33
#8 0x571cea in dhcp_option_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:381:21
#9 0x559a01 in client_handle_offer /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:1543:13
#10 0x5592bd in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-client.c:78:9
#11 0x44a379 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a379)
#12 0x42ae1f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x42ae1f)
#13 0x432ade in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x432ade)
#14 0x421f86 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421f86)
#15 0x7fdf4f89f55f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f)
#16 0x7fdf4f89f60b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b)
#17 0x421fd4 in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421fd4)
SUMMARY: libFuzzer: timeout
```
by always calling journal_remote_server_destroy, which resets global
variables like journal_remote_server_global. It should prevent crashes like
```
Assertion 'journal_remote_server_global == NULL' failed at src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:312, function int journal_remote_server_init(RemoteServer *, const char *, JournalWriteSplitMode, _Bool, _Bool)(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==24769==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x0539000060c1 (pc 0x7f23b4d5818b bp 0x7ffcbc4080c0 sp 0x7ffcbc407e70 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f23b4d5818b in raise /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51:1
#1 0x7f23b4d37858 in abort /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/stdlib/abort.c:79:7
#2 0x7f23b5731809 in log_assert_failed systemd/src/basic/log.c:866:9
```
systemd seems to be failing to compile there with gcc-12 but considering
that gcc-12 hasn't been released yet it doesn't seem to make sense
to add workarounds to get it to compile there. Until gcc-12 is
stabilized it should be enough to build systemd on fedora-35 to
make sure it's buildable on i386.
Those dependencies are also used by Coverity and Codeql so
it should be installed there to get them to analyze that code.
Judging by https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/22137 it seems
to be working.
to make it easier to figure out why it fails.
For example in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/runs/4799774735?check_suite_focus=true
it failed with
```
meson.build:1003:8: ERROR: Command "/usr/bin/clang -print-targets" failed with status 1.
A full log can be found at /home/runner/work/systemd/systemd/build/meson-logs/meson-log.txt
Error: Process completed with exit code 1.
```
and it wasn't clear what exactly happened there.
to make it easier to fuzz code that uses external libraries like libelf/libdw.
The dependencies are skipped on OSS-Fuzz because they aren't available
at runtime if they aren't linked statically. This restriction can safely
be lifted when the fuzzers are built locally with all the dependencies
installed. As far as I know there is at least one fuzz target in the systemd
repository that can benefit from this: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11018
It was copy-pasted directly from OSS-Fuzz where it makes sense to
kind of strip binaries to get nice backtraces but when the fuzzers
are built and run locally with gdb it would be nice to have a little
bit more than that.
It was initially discovered in elfutils where I put the same flags
and was surprised when I couldn't run the fuzzer comfortably step
by step, which led to the same change there: https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/7092
:-)
afl-clang and hufzz-clang try to instrument the code and the
underlying compilers don't like it. It should probably be
fixed in both afl and honggfuzz eventually but until then
let's just use "raw" clang to build bpf-skeletons.
It's a follow-up to https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/21607
by moving the read permissions to the top level and
granting additional permissions to the specific jobs.
It should help to prevent new jobs that could be added
there eventually from having write access to resources they
most likely would never need.
Apparently version updates aren't always disabled on old forks,
which leads to new PRs opened there. To somewhat mitigate the
issue let's limit the number of PRs Dependabot can create.
It was reported in https://github.com/yuwata/systemd/pull/2#issuecomment-967737195
to let Dependabot keep track of them using SHAs
codeql-actions doesn't point to SHAs because it isn't clear
whether Dependabot supports their release cycle mentioned
at https://github.com/github/codeql-action/issues/307
Evgeny Vereshchagin