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systemd/src/shared/selinux-util.c
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Daan De Meyer 5ae78f0ca9 selinux-util: Make clang-tidy happy if selinux is not available 
Most of our libraries are available on all distributions so we don't
bother with making clang-tidy happy if the library is not available.
The one exception is selinux which isn't available on Arch. Let's
conditionalize the includes in selinux-util.c so that clang-tidy is
still happy on Arch where we can't install libselinux.
2026-03-20 21:51:43 +01:00

866 lines
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#if HAVE_SELINUX
#include <malloc.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <selinux/avc.h>
#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <selinux/label.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include "sd-dlopen.h"
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "label.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#endif
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "label-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
#if HAVE_SELINUX
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL_RENAME(context_t, sym_context_free, context_freep, NULL);
typedef enum Initialized {
UNINITIALIZED,
INITIALIZED,
LAZY_INITIALIZED,
} Initialized;
static int cached_use = -1;
static Initialized initialized = UNINITIALIZED;
static int last_policyload = 0;
static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd = NULL;
static bool have_status_page = false;
static int mac_selinux_label_pre(int dir_fd, const char *path, mode_t mode) {
return mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(dir_fd, path, mode);
}
static int mac_selinux_label_post(int dir_fd, const char *path, bool created) {
mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
return 0;
}
static void *libselinux_dl = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(avc_open) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(context_free) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(context_new) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(context_range_get) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(context_range_set) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(context_str) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(fgetfilecon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(fini_selinuxmnt) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(freecon) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(getcon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(getfilecon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(getpeercon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(getpidcon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(is_selinux_enabled) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(security_compute_create_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(security_getenforce) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selabel_close) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selabel_lookup_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selabel_open) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_check_access) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_getenforcemode) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_init_load_policy) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_path) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_set_callback) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_status_close) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_status_getenforce) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_status_open) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(selinux_status_policyload) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(setcon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(setexeccon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(setfilecon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(setfscreatecon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(setsockcreatecon_raw) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(string_to_security_class) = NULL;
int dlopen_libselinux(void) {
SD_ELF_NOTE_DLOPEN(
"selinux",
"Support for SELinux",
SD_ELF_NOTE_DLOPEN_PRIORITY_RECOMMENDED,
"libselinux.so.1");
return dlopen_many_sym_or_warn(
&libselinux_dl,
"libselinux.so.1",
LOG_DEBUG,
DLSYM_ARG(avc_open),
DLSYM_ARG(context_free),
DLSYM_ARG(context_new),
DLSYM_ARG(context_range_get),
DLSYM_ARG(context_range_set),
DLSYM_ARG(context_str),
DLSYM_ARG(fgetfilecon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(fini_selinuxmnt),
DLSYM_ARG(freecon),
DLSYM_ARG(getcon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(getfilecon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(getpeercon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(getpidcon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(is_selinux_enabled),
DLSYM_ARG(security_compute_create_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(security_getenforce),
DLSYM_ARG(selabel_close),
DLSYM_ARG(selabel_lookup_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(selabel_open),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_check_access),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_getenforcemode),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_init_load_policy),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_path),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_set_callback),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_status_close),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_status_getenforce),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_status_open),
DLSYM_ARG(selinux_status_policyload),
DLSYM_ARG(setcon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(setexeccon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(setfilecon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(setfscreatecon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(setsockcreatecon_raw),
DLSYM_ARG(string_to_security_class));
}
#endif
bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (_unlikely_(cached_use < 0)) {
if (dlopen_libselinux() < 0)
return (cached_use = false);
cached_use = sym_is_selinux_enabled() > 0;
log_trace("SELinux enabled state cached to: %s", enabled_disabled(cached_use));
}
return cached_use;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
bool mac_selinux_enforcing(void) {
int r = 0;
#if HAVE_SELINUX
/* If the SELinux status page has been successfully opened, retrieve the enforcing
* status over it to avoid system calls in security_getenforce(). */
if (dlopen_libselinux() < 0)
return false;
if (have_status_page)
r = sym_selinux_status_getenforce();
else
r = sym_security_getenforce();
#endif
return r != 0;
}
void mac_selinux_retest(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
cached_use = -1;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int open_label_db(void) {
struct selabel_handle *hnd;
/* Avoid maybe-uninitialized false positives */
usec_t before_timestamp = USEC_INFINITY, after_timestamp = USEC_INFINITY;
struct mallinfo2 before_mallinfo = {};
int r;
r = dlopen_libselinux();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
before_mallinfo = mallinfo2();
before_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
}
hnd = sym_selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
if (!hnd)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to initialize SELinux labeling handle: %m");
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
after_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
struct mallinfo2 after_mallinfo = mallinfo2();
size_t l = LESS_BY(after_mallinfo.uordblks, before_mallinfo.uordblks);
log_debug("Successfully loaded SELinux database in %s, size on heap is %zuK.",
FORMAT_TIMESPAN(after_timestamp - before_timestamp, 0),
DIV_ROUND_UP(l, 1024));
}
/* release memory after measurement */
if (label_hnd)
sym_selabel_close(label_hnd);
label_hnd = TAKE_PTR(hnd);
return 0;
}
#endif
static int selinux_init(bool force) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static const LabelOps label_ops = {
.pre = mac_selinux_label_pre,
.post = mac_selinux_label_post,
};
int r;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
if (initialized == INITIALIZED)
return 1;
/* Internal call from this module? Unless we were explicitly configured to allow lazy initialization
* bail out immediately. Pretend all is good, we do not want callers to abort here, for example at
* early boot when the policy is being initialised. */
if (!force && initialized != LAZY_INITIALIZED)
return 1;
mac_selinux_disable_logging();
r = sym_selinux_status_open(/* netlink fallback= */ 1);
if (r < 0) {
if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno))
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to open SELinux status page: %m");
log_warning_errno(errno, "selinux_status_open() with netlink fallback failed, not checking for policy reloads: %m");
} else if (r == 1)
log_warning("selinux_status_open() failed to open the status page, using the netlink fallback.");
else
have_status_page = true;
r = open_label_db();
if (r < 0) {
sym_selinux_status_close();
return r;
}
r = label_ops_set(&label_ops);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Save the current policyload sequence number, so mac_selinux_maybe_reload() does not trigger on
* first call without any actual change. */
last_policyload = sym_selinux_status_policyload();
initialized = INITIALIZED;
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_init(void) {
return selinux_init(/* force= */ true);
}
int mac_selinux_init_lazy(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (initialized == UNINITIALIZED)
initialized = LAZY_INITIALIZED; /* We'll be back later */
#endif
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int mac_selinux_reload(int seqno) {
log_debug("SELinux reload %d", seqno);
(void) open_label_db();
return 0;
}
#endif
void mac_selinux_maybe_reload(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int policyload;
if (!initialized)
return;
if (dlopen_libselinux() < 0)
return;
/* Do not use selinux_status_updated(3), cause since libselinux 3.2 selinux_check_access(3),
* called in core and user instances, does also use it under the hood.
* That can cause changes to be consumed by selinux_check_access(3) and not being visible here.
* Also do not use selinux callbacks, selinux_set_callback(3), cause they are only automatically
* invoked since libselinux 3.2 by selinux_status_updated(3).
* Relevant libselinux commit: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/05bdc03130d741e53e1fb45a958d0a2c184be503
* Debian Bullseye is going to ship libselinux 3.1, so stay compatible for backports. */
policyload = sym_selinux_status_policyload();
if (policyload < 0) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to get SELinux policyload from status page: %m");
return;
}
if (policyload != last_policyload) {
mac_selinux_reload(policyload);
last_policyload = policyload;
}
#endif
}
void mac_selinux_finish(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (label_hnd) {
sym_selabel_close(label_hnd);
label_hnd = NULL;
}
if (sym_selinux_status_close)
sym_selinux_status_close();
have_status_page = false;
initialized = false;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_printf_(2,3)
static int selinux_log_glue(int type, const char *fmt, ...) {
return 0;
}
#endif
void mac_selinux_disable_logging(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
/* Turn off all of SELinux' own logging, we want to do that ourselves */
if (dlopen_libselinux() < 0)
return;
sym_selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (const union selinux_callback) { .func_log = selinux_log_glue });
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int selinux_fix_fd(
int fd,
const char *label_path,
LabelFixFlags flags) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char* fcon = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(label_path);
assert(path_is_absolute(label_path));
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return -errno;
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
if (sym_selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, label_path, st.st_mode) < 0) {
/* If there's no label to set, then exit without warning */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Unable to lookup intended SELinux security context of %s: %m", label_path);
}
r = RET_NERRNO(sym_setfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), fcon));
if (r < 0) {
/* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */
if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
return 0;
/* It the FS is read-only and we were told to ignore failures caused by that, suppress error */
if (r == -EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS))
return 0;
/* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */
_cleanup_freecon_ char *oldcon = NULL;
if (sym_getfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), &oldcon) >= 0 && streq_ptr(fcon, oldcon))
return 0;
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s: %m", label_path);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int mac_selinux_fix_full(
int atfd,
const char *inode_path,
const char *label_path,
LabelFixFlags flags) {
assert(atfd >= 0 || atfd == AT_FDCWD);
assert(atfd >= 0 || inode_path);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_close_ int opened_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
int inode_fd, r;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
if (inode_path) {
opened_fd = openat(atfd, inode_path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
if (opened_fd < 0) {
if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return -errno;
}
inode_fd = opened_fd;
} else
inode_fd = atfd;
if (!label_path) {
if (path_is_absolute(inode_path))
label_path = inode_path;
else {
r = fd_get_path(inode_fd, &p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
label_path = p;
}
}
return selinux_fix_fd(inode_fd, label_path, flags);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_apply(const char *path, const char *label) {
assert(path);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
assert(label);
if (sym_setfilecon_raw(path, label) < 0)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, path);
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_apply_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *label) {
assert(fd >= 0);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
assert(label);
if (sym_setfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), label) < 0)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, strna(path));
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **ret_label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
int r;
assert(exe);
assert(ret_label);
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sym_getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!mycon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sym_getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!fcon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sclass = sym_string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
return RET_NERRNO(sym_security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, ret_label));
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **ret_label) {
assert(ret_label);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
_cleanup_freecon_ char *con = NULL;
if (sym_getcon_raw(&con) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!con)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
*ret_label = TAKE_PTR(con);
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_get_peer_label(int socket_fd, char **ret_label) {
assert(socket_fd >= 0);
assert(ret_label);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
_cleanup_freecon_ char *con = NULL;
if (sym_getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &con) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!con)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
*ret_label = TAKE_PTR(con);
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **ret_label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
_cleanup_(context_freep) context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL;
const char *range = NULL, *bcon_str = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
int r;
assert(socket_fd >= 0);
assert(exe);
assert(ret_label);
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sym_getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!mycon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sym_getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!peercon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!exec_label) { /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context of target executable */
if (sym_getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!fcon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
bcon = sym_context_new(mycon);
if (!bcon)
return -ENOMEM;
pcon = sym_context_new(peercon);
if (!pcon)
return -ENOMEM;
range = sym_context_range_get(pcon);
if (!range)
return -errno;
if (sym_context_range_set(bcon, range) != 0)
return -errno;
bcon_str = sym_context_str(bcon);
if (!bcon_str)
return -ENOMEM;
sclass = sym_string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
return RET_NERRNO(sym_security_compute_create_raw(bcon_str, fcon, sclass, ret_label));
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(const char *abspath, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char *filecon = NULL;
int r;
assert(abspath);
assert(path_is_absolute(abspath));
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
r = sym_selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, abspath, mode);
if (r < 0) {
/* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it. */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", abspath);
}
if (sym_setfscreatecon_raw(filecon) < 0)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", filecon, abspath);
return 0;
}
#endif
int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(
int dir_fd,
const char *path,
mode_t mode) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
int r;
assert(dir_fd >= 0 || dir_fd == AT_FDCWD);
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
if (isempty(path) || !path_is_absolute(path)) {
r = fd_get_path(dir_fd, &abspath);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!isempty(path) && !path_extend(&abspath, path))
return -ENOMEM;
path = abspath;
}
return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(path, mode);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_label(const char *path, const char *label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
if (!label)
return 0;
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (sym_setfscreatecon_raw(label) < 0)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set specified SELinux security context '%s' for '%s': %m", label, strna(path));
#endif
return 0;
}
void mac_selinux_create_file_clear(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (selinux_init(/* force= */ false) <= 0)
return;
(void) sym_setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_create_socket_prepare(const char *label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
assert(label);
r = selinux_init(/* force= */ false);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (sym_setsockcreatecon_raw(label) < 0)
return log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for sockets: %m", label);
#endif
return 0;
}
void mac_selinux_create_socket_clear(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (selinux_init(/* force= */ false) <= 0)
return;
(void) sym_setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL);
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) {
/* Binds a socket and label its file system object according to the SELinux policy */
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL;
const struct sockaddr_un *un;
bool context_changed = false;
size_t sz;
char *path;
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(addr);
assert(addrlen >= sizeof(sa_family_t));
if (selinux_init(/* force= */ false) <= 0)
goto skipped;
if (!label_hnd)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out non-local sockets */
if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out anonymous sockets */
if (addrlen < offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out abstract namespace sockets */
un = (const struct sockaddr_un*) addr;
if (un->sun_path[0] == 0)
goto skipped;
sz = addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
if (sz > PATH_MAX)
goto skipped;
path = strndupa_safe(un->sun_path, sz);
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
if (!label_hnd)
goto skipped;
if (path_is_absolute(path))
r = sym_selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, path, S_IFSOCK);
else {
_cleanup_free_ char *newpath = NULL;
r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &newpath);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = sym_selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, newpath, S_IFSOCK);
}
if (r < 0) {
/* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it */
if (errno == ENOENT)
goto skipped;
r = log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else {
if (sym_setfscreatecon_raw(fcon) < 0) {
r = log_selinux_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", fcon, path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else
context_changed = true;
}
r = RET_NERRNO(bind(fd, addr, addrlen));
if (context_changed)
(void) sym_setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
return r;
skipped:
#endif
return RET_NERRNO(bind(fd, addr, addrlen));
}
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