Files
systemd/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c
T
Lennart Poettering 8d042bc40a tpm2-util: more iovec'ification
Let's move more code to using struct iovec for passing around binary
chunks of data.

No real changes in behaviour, just refactoring.
2024-01-05 11:34:46 +01:00

288 lines
11 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "ask-password-api.h"
#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "json.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "tpm2-util.h"
static int get_pin(usec_t until, AskPasswordFlags ask_password_flags, bool headless, char **ret_pin_str) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pin = NULL;
int r;
assert(ret_pin_str);
r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &pin_str);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m");
if (!r) {
if (headless)
return log_error_errno(
SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG),
"PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. "
"Use the '$PIN' environment variable.");
pin = strv_free_erase(pin);
r = ask_password_auto(
"Please enter TPM2 PIN:",
"drive-harddisk",
NULL,
"tpm2-pin",
"cryptsetup.tpm2-pin",
until,
ask_password_flags,
&pin);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to ask for user pin: %m");
assert(strv_length(pin) == 1);
pin_str = strdup(pin[0]);
if (!pin_str)
return log_oom();
}
*ret_pin_str = TAKE_PTR(pin_str);
return r;
}
int acquire_tpm2_key(
const char *volume_name,
const char *device,
uint32_t hash_pcr_mask,
uint16_t pcr_bank,
const struct iovec *pubkey,
uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
const char *signature_path,
const char *pcrlock_path,
uint16_t primary_alg,
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const struct iovec *key_data,
const struct iovec *policy_hash,
const struct iovec *salt,
const struct iovec *srk,
TPM2Flags flags,
usec_t until,
bool headless,
AskPasswordFlags ask_password_flags,
struct iovec *ret_decrypted_key) {
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *signature_json = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *loaded_blob = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *auto_device = NULL;
struct iovec blob;
int r;
assert(iovec_is_valid(salt));
if (!device) {
r = tpm2_find_device_auto(&auto_device);
if (r == -ENODEV)
return -EAGAIN; /* Tell the caller to wait for a TPM2 device to show up */
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not find TPM2 device: %m");
device = auto_device;
}
if (iovec_is_set(key_data))
blob = *key_data;
else {
_cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
/* If we read the salt via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */
if (asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup-tpm2/%s", random_u64(), volume_name) < 0)
return log_oom();
r = read_full_file_full(
AT_FDCWD, key_file,
key_file_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : key_file_offset,
key_file_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : key_file_size,
READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
bindname,
(char**) &loaded_blob, &blob.iov_len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
blob.iov_base = loaded_blob;
}
if (pubkey_pcr_mask != 0) {
r = tpm2_load_pcr_signature(signature_path, &signature_json);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load pcr signature: %m");
}
_cleanup_(tpm2_pcrlock_policy_done) Tpm2PCRLockPolicy pcrlock_policy = {};
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)) {
r = tpm2_pcrlock_policy_load(pcrlock_path, &pcrlock_policy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(device, &tpm2_context);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create TPM2 context: %m");
if (!(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)) {
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
pubkey,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
signature_json,
/* pin= */ NULL,
FLAGS_SET(flags, TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK) ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL,
primary_alg,
&blob,
policy_hash,
srk,
ret_decrypted_key);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unseal secret using TPM2: %m");
return r;
}
for (int i = 5;; i--) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL, *b64_salted_pin = NULL;
if (i <= 0)
return -EACCES;
r = get_pin(until, ask_password_flags, headless, &pin_str);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (iovec_is_set(salt)) {
uint8_t salted_pin[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {};
CLEANUP_ERASE(salted_pin);
r = tpm2_util_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256(pin_str, strlen(pin_str), salt->iov_base, salt->iov_len, salted_pin);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to perform PBKDF2: %m");
r = base64mem(salted_pin, sizeof(salted_pin), &b64_salted_pin);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to base64 encode salted pin: %m");
} else
/* no salting needed, backwards compat with non-salted pins */
b64_salted_pin = TAKE_PTR(pin_str);
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
pubkey,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
signature_json,
b64_salted_pin,
pcrlock_path ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL,
primary_alg,
&blob,
policy_hash,
srk,
ret_decrypted_key);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unseal secret using TPM2: %m");
/* We get this error in case there is an authentication policy mismatch. This should
* not happen, but this avoids confusing behavior, just in case. */
if (!IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -ENOLCK))
continue;
}
return r;
}
}
int find_tpm2_auto_data(
struct crypt_device *cd,
uint32_t search_pcr_mask,
int start_token,
uint32_t *ret_hash_pcr_mask,
uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank,
struct iovec *ret_pubkey,
uint32_t *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask,
uint16_t *ret_primary_alg,
struct iovec *ret_blob,
struct iovec *ret_policy_hash,
struct iovec *ret_salt,
struct iovec *ret_srk,
TPM2Flags *ret_flags,
int *ret_keyslot,
int *ret_token) {
int r, token;
assert(cd);
for (token = start_token; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec blob = {}, policy_hash = {}, pubkey = {}, salt = {}, srk = {};
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL;
uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask;
uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
TPM2Flags flags;
int keyslot;
r = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, "systemd-tpm2", &v);
if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -EINVAL, -EMEDIUMTYPE))
continue;
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read JSON token data off disk: %m");
r = tpm2_parse_luks2_json(
v,
&keyslot,
&hash_pcr_mask,
&pcr_bank,
&pubkey,
&pubkey_pcr_mask,
&primary_alg,
&blob,
&policy_hash,
&salt,
&srk,
&flags);
if (r == -EUCLEAN) /* Gracefully handle issues in JSON fields not owned by us */
continue;
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse TPM2 JSON data: %m");
if (search_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ||
search_pcr_mask == hash_pcr_mask) {
if (start_token <= 0)
log_info("Automatically discovered security TPM2 token unlocks volume.");
*ret_hash_pcr_mask = hash_pcr_mask;
*ret_pcr_bank = pcr_bank;
*ret_pubkey = TAKE_STRUCT(pubkey);
*ret_pubkey_pcr_mask = pubkey_pcr_mask;
*ret_primary_alg = primary_alg;
*ret_blob = TAKE_STRUCT(blob);
*ret_policy_hash = TAKE_STRUCT(policy_hash);
*ret_salt = TAKE_STRUCT(salt);
*ret_keyslot = keyslot;
*ret_token = token;
*ret_srk = TAKE_STRUCT(srk);
*ret_flags = flags;
return 0;
}
/* PCR mask doesn't match what is configured, ignore this entry, let's see next */
}
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO), "No valid TPM2 token data found.");
}