When an administrator installed a custom keyring under /etc,
signature verification selected it instead of the vendor keyring
under /usr. That could make vendor-signed system updates stop
verifying after adding local keys.
Collect all readable default keyrings, including the current and
legacy /etc paths, and pass temporary copies to GnuPG with
separate --keyring options. Keep SYSTEMD_OPENPGP_KEYRING as an
explicit override, add regression coverage for keyring
coexistence, override behavior, and current-path signing, and
silence the expected shellcheck false positive in the test
cleanup helper.
Closes: #40702
Adds dm-clone device setup at boot via a new /etc/clonetab config file,
following the crypttab/veritytab pattern.
- Add systemd-clonesetup-generator to parse /etc/clonetab and generate units.
- Add systemd-clonesetup binary to create/remove dm-clone devices via ioctl.
- Add clonesetup.target for ordering dm-clone activation at boot.
- Add region_size= option in clonetab to configure dm-clone hydration granularity.
- Add clonetab(5) and systemd-clonesetup-generator(8) man pages.
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/39500
By default there is a fixed keyring in /usr or /etc. But when running
systemd-pull unprivileged in the user context or with a custom transfer
definition as in systemd-sysupdate --definitions=./... (e.g., for local
ParticleOS updates) it is limiting to require that all keys have to be
part of the OS keyring or otherwise no verification can be used. Also,
for testing it is valuable to point it at a different keyring.
Add a SYSTEMD_OPENPGP_KEYRING env var where the omission or empty
assignment sticks to the current behavior of the global OS keyrings but
a keyring path given will take precedence. While an env var can leak
down the process tree and is more difficult to secure for being the
trust anchor the advantage is that one can directly specify it in the
service unit as drop-in instead of having to patch the command
invocation. Anyway it's a niche use case and thus not part of the man
page.
Define a new io.systemd.SysUpdate.Notify Varlink interface with a single
OnCompletedUpdate() method, and after sysupdate successfully installs an
update, invoke that method on every socket linked into
/run/systemd/sysupdate/notify/ via varlink_execute_directory(). This
gives other components a hook to react to applied updates (e.g. recompute
a TPM policy, link a freshly downloaded kernel, refresh extensions).
The notification carries the component name, the installed version and the
list of updated resources (transfer id + on-disk path). Subscribers are
free to ignore the parameters and just treat the call as a trigger.
Setting SYSTEMD_SYSUPDATE_FORCE_NOTIFY=1 forces the notification to be sent
even when no update was applied (in which case no resource list is included),
so follow-up work can be triggered unconditionally.
Fixes: #35988
This commit adds support to /etc/hostname for substitution
of $ wordlists from {/etc,/run,/usr/lib}/systemd/hostname-wordlist.
The first $ will lookup hostname-wordlist/1, the next
hostname-wordlist/2 and so on.
With that we can do a petname [1] style hostname in systemd, e.g.
below a possible expansion for a hostname template:
$-$-$-???? -> wildly-happy-octopus-92a9
The substitution of words is stable (based on machine-id) but
not persisted, it is picked on every boot via a stable file
offset so the operation is cheap. But this means that if the
wordlist changes the hostname would change. The next commit
will add the pattern to the firstboot.hostname credential which
is persistet with the resolved names to avoid this issue.
This also includes a wordlist from the "petname" project
that can be optionally installed.
Thanks to Dustin Kirkland for this wonderful project.
[1] https://github.com/dustinkirkland/petname
This allows multi-call binaries to be easily invoked with a different
name. After installation, the name is set by creating a symlink. But in
build directories, we don't create the symlinks. (There are also other
ways to achieve the same thing, e.g. zsh supports $ARGV0, and exec -a
can be used, but those are either non-portable or are more complicated
to use.) The primary use-case for me is to test --help output for
multicall binaries.
Also reorder the help for env vars to group the more generic ones near
the top.
This was initially proposed in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/24054,
but there were some comments about the implementation. I had a branch
with the patch, but I don't think I ever actually submitted it as a
pull request.
Add options to vmspawn to configure journal-remote disk usage limits
when forwarding journal entries from the VM. These are passed through
as --max-use=, --keep-free=, --max-file-size=, and --max-files=
command-line arguments to systemd-journal-remote.
Add --max-use=, --keep-free=, --max-file-size=, and --max-files=
command-line options to systemd-journal-remote to allow overriding the
corresponding settings from the configuration file.
Add $SYSTEMD_JOURNAL_REMOTE_CONFIG_FILE environment variable support
to systemd-journal-remote. When set, the specified file is used
instead of the default configuration file and drop-in directories.
When set to the empty string or /dev/null, configuration file parsing
is skipped entirely. vmspawn sets this to /dev/null in the child
process to avoid inheriting the host's journal-remote configuration.
Make fork_notify() argv parameter optional. When NULL is passed,
fork_notify() returns 0 in the child (with $NOTIFY_SOCKET set) and
lets the caller run custom code before exec. Returns 1 in the parent.
This allows vmspawn to set environment variables in the child without
polluting the parent process.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When sd_varlink_connect_url() gets an unknown URL we now
check if there is a `$LIBEXECDIR/varlink-bridges/$scheme`
binary and execute it (with the url as the first arguments).
This makes varlink more flexible as it provides a way to
dynamically add "bridges" in LIBEXECDIR/varlink-bridges/. This is
conceptually similar to the libvarlink `varlink --bridge` command
and allows to e.g. call varlink over http{,s} via e.g. the new
varlink-http-bridge.
With a running varlink-http-bridge [0] one can do:
```console
$ varlinkctl call http://localhost:8080/ws/sockets/io.systemd.Hostname \
io.systemd.Hostname.Describe {}
{
"Hostname" : "top",
...
```
Closes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/40640
[0] https://github.com/mvo5/varlink-http-bridge/pull/1
Unprivileged processes can send 768M in a FD-based message to journald,
which will be malloc'ed in one go, likely causing memory issues.
Set the limit for unprivileged users to 24M.
Allow coredumps as an exception, since we always allowed storing
up to the 768M max core files in the journal.
Reported on yeswehack.com as #YWH-PGM9780-48
When setting SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug and debugging a tool that happens
to do NSS lookups, the resulting logs from varlink are obnoxiously
verbose. Let's parse a separate log level environment variable in NSS
to allow overriding the log level for NSS specifically so these noisy
logs can be silenced.
In order to make "freeze" attacks against the update logic harder let's
add the ability to encode a "Best Before" date into SHA256SUMS directory
listings: if the current time is already beyond that time, we'll ignore
the SHA256SUMS as "stale" and fail the upgrade. Or in other words: the
freeze attack will now result in a client-side error eventually, instead
of success state.
The best before data is encoded in an optional pseudo-file listed in SHA256SUMS:
any file named BEST-BEFORE-YYYY-MM-DD.
As announced by a few releases now, finally drop support for
sysvinit scripts.
Keep rc-local generator for now, as it's really a distinct
feature even though from the same era.
Load modules in parallel using a pool of worker threads. The number of
threads is equal to the number of CPUs, with a maximum of 16 (to avoid
too many threads being started during boot on systems with many an high
core count, since the number of modules loaded on boot is usually on
the small side).
The number of threads can optionally be specified manually using the
SYSTEMD_MODULES_LOAD_NUM_THREADS environment variable; in this case,
no limit is enforced. If SYSTEMD_MODULES_LOAD_NUM_THREADS is set to 0,
probing happens sequentially.
Co-authored-by: Eric Curtin <ecurtin@redhat.com>
By giving priority to --background= we prevent users from opting
out of coloring if an explicit color is chosen by a tool wrapping
one of our own tools. Instead, let's give priority to the environment
variable, so that even if our tools are wrapped by another tool with
a different background, users can still opt out of coloring just by
setting the environment variable, which has a high chance of being
forwarded to the invocation of our own tools which makes it easy to
use to disable color tinting globally if requested by the user.
Let's reduce our attack surface by insisting that XBOOTLDR is vfat when
auto-probing, just like we do for the ESP. Given neither can
realistically be integrity protected (because firmware needs to access
them) let's insist on a vfat which has a much smaller attack surface,
and one we have to accept (for now) anyway, given that the ESP must be
VFAT.
This only applies to auto-probing of course. If people mount things
explicitly via fstab none of this matters. But we really shouldn't
automount a btrfs/xfs/ext4 partition as XBOOTLDR just because it looks
like one, as that would really defeat our otherwise possibly very strict
image policies.
This also introduces a new env var $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_FSTYPE_<DESIGNATOR>
environment variable that may override this hardcoding. This is in
particular useful in our testcases, since various actually do use ext4
as XBOOTLDR case. The tests are updated to make use of the new env var,
both as a mechanism to test this and to keep the tests working.
Sharing verity volumes is problematic for a veriety of reasons, for
example because it might pin the wrong backing device at the wrong time.
Let's hence turn this around: unless verity sharing is enabled, leave it
off, and turn $SYSTEMD_VERITY_SHARING into a true boolean that can be
set both ways.
The primary usecase for verity sharing is RootImage=, where it probably
makes sense to leave on, hence set the flag there.
This is crucial when putting together installers which install an OS on
a second disk: if verity sharing is always on we might mount the wrong
of the two disks at the wrong time.
Some configuration files that need updates are directly under in /etc. To
update them atomically, we need write access to /etc. For Ubuntu Core this is
an issue as /etc is not writable. Only a selection of subdirectories can be
writable. The general solution is symlinks or bind mounts to writable places.
But for atomic writes in /etc, that does not work. So Ubuntu has had a patch
for that that did not age well.
Instead we would like to introduce some environment variables for alternate
paths.
* SYSTEMD_ETC_HOSTNAME: /etc/hostname
* SYSTEMD_ETC_MACHINE_INFO: /etc/machine-info
* SYSTEMD_ETC_LOCALTIME: /etc/localtime
* SYSTEMD_ETC_LOCALE_CONF: /etc/locale.conf
* SYSTEMD_ETC_VCONSOLE_CONF: /etc/vconsole.conf
* SYSTEMD_ETC_ADJTIME: /etc/adjtime
While it is for now expected that there is a symlink from the standard, we
still try to read them from that alternate path. This is important for
`/etc/localtime`, which is a symlink, so we cannot have an indirect symlink or
bind mount for it.
Since machine-id is typically written only once and not updated. This commit
does not cover it. An initrd can properly create it and bind mount it.
Previously, systemd-networkd sent machine ID as chassis ID.
Let's use application specific machine ID.
This is a kind of backward compat breaking. Hence, this also introduces
the support of $SD_LLDP_SEND_MACHINE_ID environment variable.
Closes#37613.
When dissecting an image, let's make use of the Verity data even if we
got told no root hash explicitly: we can simply determine it by
concatenating the data partition uuid with the verity partition uuid.
Of course, on first thought this doesn't really add much: if the root
hash is not pinned from somewhere, this does not guarantee trust in
the image.
However, this is very useful for attestation: if we have the root hash
we can measure it before mounting things, even if we don't actually
authenticate it.
Hence, at best this helps us with attestation, at worst it doesn't improve
security but certainly doesn't hurt it.
Since this only covers user creation/registration for now, let's hide it
behind an env var. We might reconsider this eventually and make it a
proper switch one day, but who knows, it after all has this "debug tool"
wiff.
When we're building ParticleOS images, we don't want the package
manager (or mkosi) to run systemd-sysusers, systemd-tmpfiles or
systemctl preset so let's add a few more bypass environment
variables that we can set to have execution of these skipped like
we already have $SYSTEMD_HWDB_UPDATE_BYPASS and $KERNEL_INSTALL_BYPASS.
This has been depracted since v254 (2023). Let's kill it for
good now, it has been long enough with 2y. Noone has shown up who wants
to keep it. And given it doesn't work in SB world anyway, and is not
measured is quite problematic security wise.
Currently ask_password_auto() will always try to store the password into
the user keyring. Let's make this configurable so that we can configure
ask_password_auto() into the session keyring. This is required when working
with user namespaces, as the user keyring is namespaced by user namespaces
which makes it impossible to share cached keys across user namespaces by using
the user namespace while this is possible with the session keyring.
In mkosi, we want an easy way to set the keyring timeout for every
tool we invoke that might use systemd-ask-password to query for a
password which is then stored in the kernel keyring. Let's make this
possible via a new $SYSTEMD_ASK_PASSWORD_KEYRING_TIMEOUT_SEC environment
variable.
Using an environment variable means we don't have to modify every separate
tool to add a CLI option allowing to specify the timeout. In mkosi specifically,
we'll set up a new session keyring for the mkosi process linked to the user keyring
so that any pins in the user keyring are used if available, and otherwise we'll query
for and store password in mkosi's session keyring with a zero timeout so that they stay
in the keyring until the mkosi process exits at which point they're removed from the
keyring.
Similar to 24a4542c. 24a4542c can only be set 1 in 1s at most,
sometimes we may need to set to something else(such as 1 in 2s).
So it's best to let the user decide.
This also allows users to solve #34690.
When running unprivileged, checking /proc/1/root doesn't work because
it requires privileges. Instead, let's add an environment variable so
the process that chroot's can tell (systemd) subprocesses whether
they're running in a chroot or not.
Like much English text, the systemd documentation uses "may not" in the
sense of both "will possibly not" and "is forbidden to". In many cases
this is OK because the context makes it clear, but in others I felt it
was possible to read the "is forbidden to" sense by mistake: in
particular, I tripped over "the target file may not exist" in
systemd.unit(5) before realizing the correct interpretation.
Use "might not" or "may choose not to" in these cases to make it clear
which sense we mean.
Some people are just sad, sad lost souls who don't like even the tiniest
ray of color in their life. Let's add an env var knob for allowing them
to turn the background tinting off, to drive the last bit of color from
their life so that they can stay in their grey grey life.
Lennart Poettering
zouge666
Simran Singh
Kai Lüke
Michael Vogt
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Daan De Meyer
andre4ik3
Luca Boccassi
DaanDeMeyer
Lennart Poettering
Yu Watanabe
Francesco VallaandEric Curtin
Nick Labich
ners
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Valentin David
Mike Yuan
xujing
Gaël PORTAY
Mantas Mikulėnas
Colin Watson
Sam Leonard