This allows sysusers to operate with --root that is an empty directory.
It may be useful to, for example, populate the user database before installing
anything else.
firstboot was already doing this, so drop the duplicated call there.
$ SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug build/systemd-firstboot --prompt-root-password
Found container virtualization systemd-nspawn.
Found /etc/locale.conf, assuming locale information has been configured.
Failed to read credential firstboot.keymap, ignoring: No such device or address
Prompting for keymap was not requested.
Found /etc/localtime, assuming timezone has been configured.
Prompting for hostname was not requested.
Found /etc/machine-id, assuming machine-id has been configured.
Found /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, assuming root account has been initialized.
Creation of /etc/kernel/cmdline was not requested, skipping.
/bin/sh as a shell is punishing. There is no good reason to make
the occasional root login unpleasant.
Since /bin/sh is usually /bin/bash in compat mode, i.e. if one is
available, the other will be too, /bin/bash is almost as good as a default.
But to avoid a regression in the situation where /bin/bash (or
DEFAULT_USER_SHELL) is not installed, we check with access() and fall back
to /bin/sh. This should make this change in behaviour less risky.
(FWIW, e.g. Fedora/RHEL use /bin/bash as default for root.)
This is a follow-up of sorts for 53350c7bba,
which added the default-user-shell option, but most likely with the idea
of using /bin/bash less ;)
Fixes#24369.
A long name of one parameter was making the whole thing very wide.
I think that it's obvious from the context what the argument is,
so a shorter name should be just as good.
These functions are used pretty much independently of locale, i.e. the
only info relevant is whether th locale is UTF-8 or not. Hence let's
give this its own pair of .c/.h files.
In general we almost never hit those asserts in production code, so users see
them very rarely, if ever. But either way, we just need something that users
can pass to the developers.
We have quite a few of those asserts, and some have fairly nice messages, but
many are like "WTF?" or "???" or "unexpected something". The error that is
printed includes the file location, and function name. In almost all functions
there's at most one assert, so the function name alone is enough to identify
the failure for a developer. So we don't get much extra from the message, and
we might just as well drop them.
Dropping them makes our code a tiny bit smaller, and most importantly, improves
development experience by making it easy to insert such an assert in the code
without thinking how to phrase the argument.
Let's add three defines for the 3 special cases of passwords.
Some of our tools used different values for the "locked"/"invalid" case,
let's settle on using "!*" which means the password is both locked *and*
invalid.
Other tools like to use "!!" for this case, which however is less than
ideal I think, since the this could also be a considered an entry with
an empty password, that can be enabled again by unlocking it twice.
Let's enable this in all tools that intend to write to the OS images.
It's not conditionalized for now, as there already is conditionalization
in the existance or absence of the flag in the GPT partition table (and
it's opt-in), hence it should be OK to just enable this by default for
now if the flag is set.
Previously, the flag did two things at once: enable support for using
generic partitions as root fs if there were only one/allow use of
partition-table-less images as root fs. And secondly, insist that there
was a rootfs, and fail if not. Let's split these two in two separate
options so that they can be used independently of each other.
There are cases where one wants to use one without the other (i.e. when
inspecting things with systemd-dissect tool it should be OK to do so
even if image has no root fs), and it's cleaner anyway.
It's so similar to copy_access(), hence let's move it over and rename it
in similar style to the rest of the functions.
No change in behaviour, just moving things over.
I think this formatting was originally used because it simplified
adding new options to the help messages. However, these days, most
tools their help message end with "\nSee the %s for details.\n" so
the final line almost never has to be edited which eliminates the
benefit of the custom formatting used for printf() help messages.
Let's make things more consistent and use the same formatting for
printf() help messages that we use everywhere else.
Prompted by https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/18355#discussion_r567241580
Let's clean up hostname_is_valid() a bit: let's turn the second boolean
argument into a more explanatory flags field, and add a flag that
accepts the special name ".host" as valid. This is useful for the
container logic, where the special hostname ".host" refers to the "root
container", i.e. the host system itself, and can be specified at various
places.
let's also get rid of machine_name_is_valid(). It was just an alias,
which is confusing and even more so now that we have the flags param.
Allows to specify mount options for RootImage.
In case of multi-partition images, the partition number can be prefixed
followed by colon. Eg:
RootImageOptions=1:ro,dev 2:nosuid nodev
In absence of a partition number, 0 is assumed.
It needs to be world readable (unlike /etc/shadow) when created anew.
This fixes systems that boot with "systemd-nspawn --volatile=yes", i.e.
come up with an entirely empty /etc/ and thus no existing /etc/passwd
file when firstboot runs.
There are a lot of edge cases that the current implementation
doesn't handle, especially in cases where one of passwd/shadow
exists and the other doesn't exist. For example, if
--root-password is specified, we will write /etc/shadow but
won't add a root entry to /etc/passwd if there is none.
To fix some of these issues, we constrain systemd-firstboot to
only modify /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow if both do not exist
already (or --force) is specified. On top of that, we calculate
all necessary information for both passwd and shadow upfront so
we can take it all into account when writing the actual files.
If no root password options are given --force is specified or both
files do not exist, we lock the root account for security purposes.