The parent process may not perform any label operation, so the
database might not get updated on a SELinux policy change on its own.
Reload the label database once on a policy change, instead of n times
in every started child.
I find this version much more readable.
Add replacement defines so that when acl/libacl.h is not available, the
ACL_{READ,WRITE,EXECUTE} constants are also defined. Those constants were
declared in the kernel headers already in 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1f,
so they should be the same pretty much everywhere.
Previously:
1. last_error wouldn't be updated with errors from is_dir;
2. We'd always issue a stat(), even for binaries without execute;
3. We used stat() instead of access(), which is cheaper.
This change avoids all of those, by only checking inside X_OK-positive
case whether access() works on the path with an extra slash appended.
Thanks to Lennart for the suggestion.
Add After=systemd-networkd.socket to avoid a race condition and networkd
falling back to the non-socket activation code.
Also add Wants=systemd-networkd.socket, so the socket is started when
networkd is started via `systemctl start systemd-networkd.service`.
A Requires is not strictly necessary, as networkd still ships the
non-socket activation code. Should this code be removed one day, the
Wants should be bumped to Requires accordingly.
See also 5544ee8516.
Fixes: #16809
This allows us to later port nss-resolve to use Varlink rather than
D-Bus for resolution. This has the benefit that nss-resolve based
resoluton works even without D-Bus being up. And it's faster too.
It's strictly bus-specific, hence let's move this to resolved-bus.c like
the rest of the bus specific logic.
This is also in preparation for adding an alternative varlink transport,
which needs similar functionality, but varlink instead of bus-specific.
Let's prepare for adding a new varlink interface, and thus rename the
"request" field to "bus_request", so that we can later add a
varlink_request field too.
It's pretty useful to be able to access the bytes generically, without
acknowledging a specific family, hence let's a third way to access an
in_addr_union.
Imagine $PATH /a:/b. There is an echo command at /b/echo. Under this
configuration, this works fine:
% systemd-run --user --scope echo .
Running scope as unit: run-rfe98e0574b424d63a641644af511ff30.scope
.
However, if I do `mkdir /a/echo`, this happens:
% systemd-run --user --scope echo .
Running scope as unit: run-rcbe9369537ed47f282ee12ce9f692046.scope
Failed to execute: Permission denied
We check whether the resulting file is executable for the performing
user, but of course, most directories are anyway, since that's needed to
list within it. As such, another is_dir() check is needed prior to
considering the search result final.
Another approach might be to check S_ISREG, but there may be more gnarly
edge cases there than just eliminating this obviously pathological
example, so let's just do this for now.
Ideally we would like to hide all other service's credentials for all
services. That would imply for us to enable mount namespacing for all
services, which is something we cannot do, both due to compatibility
with the status quo ante, and because a number of services legitimately
should be able to install mounts in the host hierarchy.
Hence we do the second best thing, we hide the credentials automatically
for all services that opt into mount namespacing otherwise. This is
quite different from other mount sandboxing options: usually you have to
explicitly opt into each. However, given that the credentials logic is a
brand new concept we invented right here and now, and particularly
security sensitive it's OK to reverse this, and by default hide
credentials whenever we can (i.e. whenever mount namespacing is
otherwise opt-ed in to).
Long story short: if you want to hide other service's credentials, the
most basic options is to just turn on PrivateMounts= and there you go,
they should all be gone.
When removing a directory tree as unprivileged user we might encounter
files owned by us but not deletable since the containing directory might
have the "r" bit missing in its access mode. Let's try to deal with
this: optionally if we get EACCES try to set the bit and see if it works
then.
Let's track the "dirty" state of a home directory backed by a LUKS
volume by setting a new xattr "home.home-dirty" on the backing file
whenever it is in use.
This allows us to later user this information to show a home directory
as "dirty". This is useful because we trim/allocate on log-out, and
if we don't do that a home directory will be larger than necessary. This
fact is something we should communicate to the admin.
The idea is that when an admin sees a user with a "dirty" home directory
they can ask them to log in, to clean up the dirty state, and thus trim
everything again.
Yu Watanabe
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Njibhu
Christian Göttsche
Olivier Le Moal
Lennart Poettering
PhoenixDiscord
Göran Uddeborg
Julien Humbert
Chris Down
Michael Biebl
Vito Caputo