The current implementation copied the *complete* header to boot_params,
thus making the kernel ignore many of the fields.
As mentioned in the code comment for the sentinel variable in
bootparam.h a bootloader should only copy the setup_header, set some
fields in boot_params and zero out anything else.
This change makes systemd-boot (mostly) compliant with the Linux Boot
Protocol and the EFI Handover Protocol described in bootparam.h and
Documentation/boot.txt to fix various issues:
- Secure boot not being detected corretly by Linux (#11717)
- tboot error message / warning on boot (#11717)
- Strange purple text color when booting in qemu with OVMF
- Hopefully even more ...
This reverts commit b4f9f2a62f.
Revert this because a) the quiet bug is fixed in linux and b)
Documentation/boot.txt says "All other fields should be zero."
adds a fully safe way how apps can pin files into /tmp temporarily, excepting them from the tmpfiles aging algorithm, based on BSD file locks on dirs we descend into
Let services use a private UTS namespace. In addition, a seccomp filter is
installed on set{host,domain}name and a ro bind mounts on
/proc/sys/kernel/{host,domain}name.
Since commit 0722b35934, the root mountpoint is
unconditionnally turned to slave which breaks units that are using explicitly
MountFlags=shared (and no other options that would implicitly require a slave
root mountpoint).
Here is a test case:
$ systemctl cat test-shared-mount-flag.service
# /etc/systemd/system/test-shared-mount-flag.service
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/mkdir -p /mnt/tmp
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/mount -t tmpfs -o size=10M none /mnt/tmp && sleep infinity"
ExecStop=-/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/umount /mnt/tmp"
MountFlags=shared
$ systemctl start test-shared-mount-flag.service
$ findmnt /mnt/tmp
$
Mount on /mnt/tmp is not visible from the host although MountFlags=shared was
used.
This patch fixes that and turns the root mountpoint to slave when it's really
required.
Some settings cannot set simultaneously. Let's warn and drop
incompatible settings.
Currently, it is not comprehensive. But this may be a good first step.
When the link goes down, DHCP client_receive_message*() functions return an
error and the related I/O source is removed from the main loop. With the
current implementation of systemd-networkd this doesn't matter because the DHCP
client is always stopped on carrier down and restarted on carrier up. However
it seems wrong to have the DHCP client crippled (because no packet can be
received anymore) once the link goes temporarily down.
Change the receive functions to ignore a ENETDOWN event so that the client will
be able to receive packets again after the link comes back.
Paths are limited to BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX but the maximum size is anyway too big
to be allocated on the stack, so let's switch to the heap where there is a
clear way to understand if the allocation fails.
Even though the dbus specification does not enforce any length limit on the
path of a dbus message, having to analyze too long strings in PID1 may be
time-consuming and it may have security impacts.
In any case, the limit is set so high that real-life applications should not
have a problem with it.
Yu Watanabe
Michael Niewöhner
unixsysadmin
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Benjamin Dahlhoff
Lennart Poettering
Anita Zhang
Topi Miettinen
Franck Bui
Beniamino Galvani
Riccardo Schirone