Regardless of whether a mount is setup in initrd or int the main system,
the network default dependencies _netdev should still be honored.
IOW if a mount unit use the following options "x-initrd.mount,_netdev", it
should be ordered against initrd-fs.target, network.target,
network-online.target.
/dev/vdb1 /mnt ext4 x-initrd.mount,_netdev defaults 0 0
Before this patch:
Before=umount.target initrd-fs.target
After=system.slice sysroot.mount dev-vdb1.device -.mount systemd-journald.socket blockdev@dev-vdb1.target
After this patch:
Before=initrd-fs.target umount.target
After=network-online.target -.mount blockdev@dev-vdb1.target dev-vdb1.device sysroot.mount system.slice network.target systemd-journald.socket
First After=local-fs-pre.target wasn't described in the man page although it's
part of the default dependencies automatically set by pid1.
Secondly, Before=local-fs.target was only set if the automount unit was
generated from the fstab-generator because the dep was explicitly
generated. It was also not documented as a default dependency.
Fix it by managing the dep from pid1 instead.
fstab-generator was also handling the default ordering dependencies for mount
units setup in initrd. To do that it was turning the defaults dependencies off
completely and ordered the mount unit against either local-fs.target or
initrd-fs.target or initrd-root-fs.target itself.
But it had the bad side effect to also remove all other default dependencies as
well. Thus if an initrd mount was using _netdev, the network dependencies were
missing.
In general fstab-generator shouldn't use DefaultDependecies=no because it can
handle only a small set of the default dependencies the rest are dealt by pid1.
So this patch makes pid1 handle all default dependencies.
Let's not trigger MACs needlessly.
Ideally everybody would turn on userdb, but if people insist in not
doing so, then let's not attempt to open shadow.
It's a bit ugly to implement this, since shadow information is more than
just passwords (but accound validity metadata), and thus userdb's own
"privieleged" scheme is orthogonal to this, but let's still do this for
the client side.
Fixes: #15105
This patch changes the way user managers set the default umask for the units it
manages.
Indeed one can expect that if user manager's umask is redefined through PAM
(via /etc/login.defs or pam_umask), all its children including the units it
spawns have their umask set to the new value.
Hence make user units inherit their umask value from their parent instead of
the hard coded value 0022 but allow them to override this value via their unit
file.
Note that reexecuting managers with 'systemctl daemon-reexec' after changing
UMask= has no effect. To take effect managers need to be restarted with
'systemct restart' instead. This behavior was already present before this
patch.
Fixes#6077.
When managing a home directory as LUKS image we currently place a
directory at the top that contains the actual home directory (so that
the home directory of the user won't be cluttered by lost-found and
suchlike). On btrfs let's make that a subvol though. This is a good idea
so that possibly later on we can make use of this for automatic history
management.
Fixes: #15121
The commit b3ac5f8cb9 has changed the system mount propagation to
shared by default, and according to the following patch:
https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/208
When starting the container, the pouch daemon will call runc to execute
make-private.
However, if the systemctl daemon-reexec is executed after the container
has been started, the system mount propagation will be changed to share
again by default, and the make-private operation above will have no chance
to execute.
This makes the Environment entries more round-trippable: a similar format is
used for input and output. It is certainly more useful for users, because
showing [unprintable] on anything non-trivial makes systemctl show -p Environment
useless in many cases.
Fixes: #14723 and https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525593.
$ systemctl --user show -p Environment run-*.service
Environment=ASDF=asfd "SPACE= "
Environment=ASDF=asfd "SPACE=\n\n\n"
Environment=ASDF=asfd "TAB=\t\\" "FOO=X X"
non-underlined yellow uses RGB ANSI sequences while the underlined
version uses the paletted ANSI sequences. Let's unify that and use the
RGB sequence for both cases, so that underlined or not doesn't alter the
color.
This reworks the user validation infrastructure. There are now two
modes. In regular mode we are strict and test against a strict set of
valid chars. And in "relaxed" mode we just filter out some really
obvious, dangerous stuff. i.e. strict is whitelisting what is OK, but
"relaxed" is blacklisting what is really not OK.
The idea is that we use strict mode whenver we allocate a new user
(i.e. in sysusers.d or homed), while "relaxed" mode is when we process
users registered elsewhere, (i.e. userdb, logind, …)
The requirements on user name validity vary wildly. SSSD thinks its fine
to embedd "@" for example, while the suggested NAME_REGEX field on
Debian does not even allow uppercase chars…
This effectively liberaralizes a lot what we expect from usernames.
The code that warns about questionnable user names is now optional and
only used at places such as unit file parsing, so that it doesn't show
up on every userdb query, but only when processing configuration files
that know better.
Fixes: #15149#15090
The userdb_by_name() invocation immediately following does the same check
anyway, no need to do this twice.
(Also, make sure we exit the function early on failure)
This dependency is now generated automatically given we use
StateDirectory=. Moreover the combination of Wants= and After= was too
strong anway, as whether remount-fs is pulled in or not should not be up
to systemd-pstore.service, and in fact is part of the initial
transaction anyway.
And similar for other settings that require a writable /var/.
Rationale: if these options are used for early-boot services (such as
systemd-pstore.service) we need /var/ writable. And if /var/ is on the
root fs, then systemd-remount-fs.service is the service that ensures
that /var/ is writable.
This allows us to remove explicit deps in services such as
systemd-pstore.service.
sysinit.target is the target our early boot services are generally
pulled in from, make systemd-pstore.service not an exception of that.
Effectively this doesn't mean much, either way our unit is part of the
initial transaction.
Give systemd a chance to process the stop event before checking if the
PID has indeed leaked. This should fix the intermittent test fails in CI
even with a fixed systemd version, like this one:
```
Apr 08 10:22:09 testsuite-47.sh[345]: ++ cat /leakedtestpid
Apr 08 10:22:09 testsuite-47.sh[334]: + leaked_pid=342
Apr 08 10:22:09 testsuite-47.sh[334]: + systemctl stop testsuite-47-repro
Apr 08 10:22:10 testsuite-47.sh[334]: + ps -p 342
Apr 08 10:22:10 testsuite-47.sh[348]: PID TTY TIME CMD
Apr 08 10:22:10 testsuite-47.sh[348]: 342 ? 00:00:00 sleep
Apr 08 10:22:10 testsuite-47.sh[334]: + exit 42
```
Followup to 197298ff9f
let's make sure we list all singleton units we define in the preset
list, either as disable or as enable. Only four were missing, let's add
them in.
Also, let's group the pstore one with the other ones that are enabled,
right at the top.
Add `ProtectClock=yes` to systemd units. Since it implies certain
`DeviceAllow=` rules, make sure that the units have `DeviceAllow=` rules so
they are still able to access other devices. Exclude timesyncd and timedated.
A warning is emitted from sd_bus_message_{get,set}_priority. Those functions
are exposed by pystemd, so we have no easy way of checking if anything is
calling them.
Just making the functions always return without doing anything would be an
option, but then we could leave the caller with an undefined variable. So I
think it's better to make the functions emit a warnings and return priority=0
in the get operation.
Right now the kernel will not dump anything that went through setuid or
setgid. But it is routine for daemons to do that, and it makes things hard to
debug.
systemd-coredump saves the coredump readable by the users the process was
running as. This should be enough to avoid information leakage. So let's also
tell the kernel to do the coredump.
For https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1790972.
Both patterns are stored in the same file, so they are enabled or disabled
together. (Though suid_dumpable=2 is supposed to be safe even when writing to
plain files.)
Franck Bui
Lennart Poettering
Jian-Hong Pan
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Luca Boccassi
Luca Boccassi
Wen Yang
Marc-André Lureau
Frantisek Sumsal
Anita Zhang
Susant Sahani
Topi Miettinen
root