test: coco credential transport on snp (#43827)

This commit is contained in:
Luca Boccassi
2026-09-25 13:33:03 +02:00
committed by GitHub
9 changed files with 431 additions and 83 deletions
+8 -1
View File
@@ -160,12 +160,19 @@ as root. The host must have coco enabled in firmware and in the kernel (for SEV-
e.g. `kvm_amd.sev_snp=1`, with `/dev/sev` accessible). On a host without the requested e.g. `kvm_amd.sev_snp=1`, with `/dev/sev` accessible). On a host without the requested
technology, or when running in `mkosi vm` mode, the tests are skipped. technology, or when running in `mkosi vm` mode, the tests are skipped.
Inside each guest, `guest-test-runner.sh` runs the guest-side checks and reports
their results back to the host over a vsock socket, while the guest's overall
pass/fail is relayed separately through its exit status. The host side collects
both to produce the subtest result.
``` ```
meson test meson test
└─ integration-test-wrapper.py └─ integration-test-wrapper.py
└─ mkosi boot ──► systemd-nspawn container └─ mkosi boot ──► systemd-nspawn container
└─ TEST-94-COCO.sh └─ TEST-94-COCO.sh
└─ systemd-vmspawn --coco=<type> ──► confidential VM └─ TEST-94-COCO.*.sh
└─ systemd-vmspawn --coco=<type> ──► confidential VM
└─ guest-test-runner.sh
``` ```
## Running the integration tests without building systemd from source ## Running the integration tests without building systemd from source
+21 -82
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash #!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later # SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
# #
# Launch a confidential VM with systemd-vmspawn --coco= and verify the guest reports the expected # Confidential Computing test.
# confidential-virtualization type. Runs only on coco-capable hardware: the harness --coco=any flag gates
# the run (skipped otherwise), binds /dev/kvm + the coco device(s) into this boot-mode container, and
# passes the resolved technology via $COCO_TYPE.
# #
# The confidential guest boots the same mkosi test image. A one-shot unit injected into the guest checks # These only run on coco hardware and if the test environment isn't already virtualized, see
# systemd-detect-virt --cvm and reports the verdict via systemd's exit-status notification over vsock # the harness --coco= flag and the documentation in test/integration-tests/README.md.
# (SuccessAction=exit): the guest PID1 sends EXIT_STATUS to vmspawn's vmm notify socket and vmspawn exits #
# with it. # Subtests are split per platform and launch path to reduce the number of required boots.
# Test code runs on both sides:
# - host: test vmspawn by running confidential guests. TEST-94-COCO/lib.sh provides helpers.
# - guest: test guest side component coco behavior. Assertions via TEST-94-COCO/guest-test{,-runner}.sh.
set -eux set -eux
set -o pipefail set -o pipefail
# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh # shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh
. "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh . "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh
# shellcheck source=test/units/test-control.sh
. "$(dirname "$0")"/test-control.sh
if [[ -v ASAN_OPTIONS ]]; then if [[ -v ASAN_OPTIONS ]]; then
echo "vmspawn launches QEMU which doesn't work under ASan, skipping" | tee --append /skipped echo "vmspawn launches QEMU which doesn't work under ASan, skipping" | tee --append /skipped
@@ -31,83 +34,19 @@ if ! find_qemu_binary; then
exit 77 exit 77
fi fi
# The integration-test-wrapper resolves the host's coco technology on the # The harness binds the guest image artifacts read-only at /work/vm-images.
# bare-metal host (where /sys/module is readable) and passes it via $COCO_TYPE. export IMAGE_DIR=/work/vm-images
if [[ ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" || ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" || ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" ]]; then
echo "image artifacts not found in $IMAGE_DIR, skipping" | tee --append /skipped
exit 77
fi
# The integration-test-wrapper resolves the host's coco technology (where /sys/module is readable) and
# passes it via $COCO_TYPE.
if [[ -z "${COCO_TYPE:-}" ]]; then if [[ -z "${COCO_TYPE:-}" ]]; then
echo "COCO_TYPE not set (run via the integration harness with --coco), skipping" | tee --append /skipped echo "COCO_TYPE not set (run via the integration harness with --coco), skipping" | tee --append /skipped
exit 77 exit 77
fi fi
echo "Host coco type: $COCO_TYPE" echo "Host coco type: $COCO_TYPE"
# The harness binds the guest image read-only at /work/vm-images (the 'vm-images' test option). run_subtests_and_exit
IMAGE_DIR=/work/vm-images
if [[ ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" || ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" || ! -f "$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" ]]; then
echo "guest image not found in $IMAGE_DIR, skipping" | tee --append /skipped
exit 77
fi
echo "Guest image directory: $IMAGE_DIR"
MACHINE="coco-guest-$$"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
at_exit() {
set +e
machinectl terminate "$MACHINE" 2>/dev/null || :
rm -rf "$WORKDIR"
}
trap at_exit EXIT INT TERM
# One-shot unit for the guest: verify systemd-detect-virt --cvm matches the type vmspawn launched.
# Created via the systemd.extra-unit.* credential and pulled into the boot by a multi-user.target drop-in.
GUEST_PASS=123
GUEST_UNIT="$(cat <<'EOF'
[Unit]
Description=coco guest self-check
After=basic.target
SuccessAction=exit
SuccessActionExitStatus=@GUEST_PASS@
FailureAction=exit
FailureActionExitStatus=1
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=bash -c 'test "$(systemd-detect-virt --cvm)" = "@COCO_TYPE@"'
EOF
)"
GUEST_UNIT="${GUEST_UNIT//@COCO_TYPE@/$COCO_TYPE}"
GUEST_UNIT="${GUEST_UNIT//@GUEST_PASS@/$GUEST_PASS}"
GUEST_DROPIN="$(cat <<'EOF'
[Unit]
Wants=coco-guest.service
After=coco-guest.service
EOF
)"
# Launch the confidential guest and capture its console output.
# Direct linux boot should work on all coco platforms (the only boot path supported by SNP).
vmspawn_rc=0
timeout -k 30 300 systemd-vmspawn \
--machine="$MACHINE" \
--coco="$COCO_TYPE" \
--ram=1G \
--ephemeral \
--image="$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" \
--linux="$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" \
--initrd="$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" \
--tpm=no \
--console=read-only \
--set-credential="systemd.extra-unit.coco-guest.service:$GUEST_UNIT" \
--set-credential="systemd.unit-dropin.multi-user.target:$GUEST_DROPIN" \
selinux=0 systemd.firstboot=no rw \
2>&1 | tee "$WORKDIR/console.log" || vmspawn_rc="${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
if [[ "$vmspawn_rc" -eq 124 || "$vmspawn_rc" -eq 137 ]]; then
echo "systemd-vmspawn was killed by timeout (exit $vmspawn_rc)" >&2
cat "$WORKDIR/console.log" >&2
exit 1
elif [[ "$vmspawn_rc" -ne "$GUEST_PASS" ]]; then
echo "guest coco self-check did not pass: vmspawn exit $vmspawn_rc (expected $GUEST_PASS)" >&2
cat "$WORKDIR/console.log" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Guest correctly reported confidential virtualization: $COCO_TYPE"
touch /testok
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
#
# SEV-SNP, direct kernel boot: launch confidential guests with --linux=/--initrd=.
set -eux
set -o pipefail
# shellcheck source=test/units/TEST-94-COCO/lib.sh
. "$(dirname "$0")"/TEST-94-COCO/lib.sh
if [[ "${COCO_TYPE:?}" != "sev-snp" ]]; then
echo "host coco type is '$COCO_TYPE', not sev-snp, skipping"
exit 77
fi
MACHINE="coco-snp-direct-$$"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
mkdir -p "$WORKDIR/honest" "$WORKDIR/hostile"
at_exit() {
set +e
jobs -p | xargs -r kill 2>/dev/null
machinectl terminate "$MACHINE-honest" 2>/dev/null || :
machinectl terminate "$MACHINE-hostile" 2>/dev/null || :
rm -rf "$WORKDIR"
}
trap at_exit EXIT
# General test case for SNP direct boot, covers:
#
# - detect_virt: systemd-detect-virt --cvm detects SNP as the CVM type
# - creds_vmspawn: credential transport by vmspawn is working (via initrd for SNP)
# - creds_cmdline: credential transport via cmdline is working (cmdline is measured on SNP)
vmspawn_boot_coco "$MACHINE-honest" "$COCO_TYPE" "$WORKDIR/honest" 'detect_virt creds_vmspawn creds_cmdline' \
--image="$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" \
--linux="$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" \
--initrd="$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" \
--set-credential="$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID:$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_VALUE" \
selinux=0 systemd.firstboot=no rw \
"systemd.set_credential=$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_ID:$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_VALUE"
echo "SEV-SNP direct-boot guest correctly reported confidential virtualization and trusted credentials"
# Offensive test:
#
# - creds_hostile_*: ensure the guest isn't tricked into consuming untrusted/unmeasured credentials.
QEMU_EXTRA=(
-smbios "type=11,value=io.systemd.credential:$COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_ID=$COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_VALUE"
-smbios "type=11,value=io.systemd.credential:$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID=$COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_VALUE"
-fw_cfg "name=opt/io.systemd.credentials/$COCO_CRED_FWCFG_ID,string=$COCO_CRED_FWCFG_VALUE"
)
SYSTEMD_VMSPAWN_QEMU_EXTRA="${QEMU_EXTRA[*]}" \
vmspawn_boot_coco "$MACHINE-hostile" "$COCO_TYPE" "$WORKDIR/hostile" \
'detect_virt creds_vmspawn creds_hostile_fwcfg creds_hostile_snp_smbios creds_hostile_shadow' \
--image="$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" \
--linux="$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" \
--initrd="$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" \
--set-credential="$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID:$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_VALUE" \
selinux=0 systemd.firstboot=no rw
echo "SEV-SNP direct-boot guest correctly ignored the host-injected credentials"
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
#
# TDX, direct kernel boot: launch a confidential guest with --linux=/--initrd=.
set -eux
set -o pipefail
# shellcheck source=test/units/TEST-94-COCO/lib.sh
. "$(dirname "$0")"/TEST-94-COCO/lib.sh
if [[ "${COCO_TYPE:?}" != "tdx" ]]; then
echo "host coco type is '$COCO_TYPE', not tdx, skipping"
exit 77
fi
MACHINE="coco-tdx-direct-$$"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
at_exit() {
set +e
jobs -p | xargs -r kill 2>/dev/null
machinectl terminate "$MACHINE" 2>/dev/null || :
rm -rf "$WORKDIR"
}
trap at_exit EXIT
vmspawn_boot_coco "$MACHINE" "$COCO_TYPE" "$WORKDIR" 'detect_virt' \
--image="$IMAGE_DIR/image.raw" \
--linux="$IMAGE_DIR/image.vmlinuz" \
--initrd="$IMAGE_DIR/image.initrd" \
selinux=0 systemd.firstboot=no rw
echo "TDX direct-boot guest correctly reported confidential virtualization"
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
# shellcheck shell=bash
# Every constant here is consumed by whichever side sources this file, never by this file itself.
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
#
# Fixtures for the confidential computing integration test (TEST-94-COCO). Shared by the host-side
# boot scenarios, which deliver these credentials over trusted and untrusted channels alike, and by
# the guest-side checks, which assert where each one ended up, so the two sides cannot drift apart.
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" -ef "$0" ]]; then
echo >&2 "This file should not be executed directly"
exit 1
fi
# Name of the guest self-check unit lib.sh injects.
COCO_GUEST_UNIT="coco-guest.service"
# Credentials by channel
COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID="coco.trusted"
COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_VALUE="trusted-via-vmspawn"
COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_ID="coco.cmdline"
COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_VALUE="trusted-via-cmdline"
COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_ID="coco.hostile.smbios"
COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_VALUE="injected-via-smbios"
COCO_CRED_FWCFG_ID="coco.hostile.fwcfg"
COCO_CRED_FWCFG_VALUE="injected-via-fwcfg"
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
#
# Runs inside the confidential guest launched by TEST-94-COCO.sh. Runs the requested guest-side checks
# (testcase_coco_* from guest-test.sh), ships a per-check result record to the host over the vsock
# result socket, and lets the injected unit's SuccessAction/FailureAction relay the aggregate verdict
# to the host via vmspawn's exit status.
set -eux
set -o pipefail
_COCO_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "$0")")"
# util.sh (assert_*) lives one level up in the shared units dir.
# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh
. "$(dirname "$_COCO_DIR")/util.sh"
# shellcheck source=test/units/TEST-94-COCO/guest-test.sh
. "$_COCO_DIR/guest-test.sh"
# Ship the accumulated result records to the host's vsock listener (CID 2 = host). Best-effort: the
# aggregate verdict travels independently via the unit's exit status, so a vsock hiccup never masks a
# pass/fail — it only drops the per-check breakdown.
_coco_ship_results() {
local records="${1:?}"
[[ -n "${COCO_RESULT_PORT:-}" ]] || return 0
socat -u "OPEN:$records,rdonly" "VSOCK-CONNECT:2:$COCO_RESULT_PORT" ||
echo >&2 "WARNING: failed to ship coco results over vsock port $COCO_RESULT_PORT"
}
# Run the guest-side checks named by $COCO_TESTCASES (testcase_coco_* names without the prefix),
# record pass/fail per check, and ship the records. Each named check is something its boot scenario
# exists to prove, so an unknown name or an empty request fails the aggregate rather than letting the
# boot pass without having verified anything.
_coco_run_tests() {
local testcases testcase rc result failed=0 records
records="$(mktemp)"
read -ra testcases <<<"${COCO_TESTCASES:-}"
if [[ "${#testcases[@]}" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo >&2 "No coco testcases requested via \$COCO_TESTCASES"
return 1
fi
testcases=("${testcases[@]/#/testcase_coco_}")
for testcase in "${testcases[@]}"; do
if ! declare -F "$testcase" >/dev/null; then
echo >&2 "Requested coco testcase '$testcase' is not defined"
printf 'ID=%s RESULT=missing\n' "$testcase" >>"$records"
failed=1
continue
fi
# Subshell so a testcase's RETURN trap can't fire twice (see run_testcases in test-control.sh).
# Bash disables 'set -e' throughout a function called in a context that tests its exit status,
# so '("$testcase") || rc=$?' would let a testcase run past its first failed assertion and
# report only its last one. Reading $? from a standalone call avoids that context; the inner
# 'set -e' re-arms what the surrounding 'set +e' turned off.
set +e
(set -e; "$testcase")
rc=$?
set -e
if [[ "$rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
result=pass
else
result=fail
failed=1
fi
echo "coco check $testcase: $result (rc=$rc)"
printf 'ID=%s RESULT=%s\n' "$testcase" "$result" >>"$records"
done
_coco_ship_results "$records"
return "$failed"
}
_coco_run_tests
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
# shellcheck shell=bash
#
# Guest-side checks for the confidential computing integration test (TEST-94-COCO). Sourced by
# guest-test-runner.sh inside the confidential guest; each testcase_coco_* function is one
# sub-subtest, and a boot scenario names the checks it requires via $COCO_TESTCASES.
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" -ef "$0" ]]; then
echo >&2 "This file should not be executed directly"
exit 1
fi
# shellcheck source=test/units/TEST-94-COCO/fixtures.sh
. "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")/fixtures.sh"
# _coco_assert_cred_absent ID
# Assert no credential named ID reached the guest at all, neither trusted nor encrypted.
_coco_assert_cred_absent() {
local id="${1:?}"
local system_creds_dir=/run/credentials/@system
local encrypted_creds_dir=/run/credentials/@encrypted
assert_fail test -e "$system_creds_dir/$id"
assert_fail test -e "$encrypted_creds_dir/$id"
}
# _coco_assert_smbios_injected ID
# Assert the guest received an SMBIOS type #11 OEM string carrying credential ID. The scenario
# injected it, so a miss means the injection was lost on the way in and concluding anything from the
# credential's absence afterwards would be meaningless.
_coco_assert_smbios_injected() {
local id="${1:?}" raw
[[ -d /sys/firmware/dmi/entries ]] || modprobe dmi-sysfs || :
for raw in /sys/firmware/dmi/entries/11-*/raw; do
[[ -e "$raw" ]] || continue
# The entry is a blob of NUL-separated strings: --text to search it anyway, --fixed-strings
# because credential names contain dots. Redirect rather than -q, which would exit early and
# risk SIGPIPE on the reader.
if grep --text --fixed-strings "io.systemd.credential:$id=" "$raw" >/dev/null; then
return 0
fi
done
echo "FAIL: no SMBIOS OEM string for credential '$id' in the guest's DMI type #11 tables" >&2
return 1
}
# Assert the guest observes the confidential-virtualization technology the host launched it with.
# COCO_TYPE is provided by the injected guest unit (Environment=, see lib.sh).
testcase_coco_detect_virt() {
assert_eq "$(systemd-detect-virt --cvm)" "${COCO_TYPE:?}"
}
# Assert a credential handed to systemd-vmspawn --set-credential lands in the trusted bucket.
#
# SNP: creds should be delivered via the initrd cpio channel.
testcase_coco_creds_vmspawn() {
assert_eq "$(systemd-creds --system cat "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID")" "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_VALUE"
assert_not_in "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID" "$(</proc/cmdline)"
}
# Assert a credential passed on the kernel command line lands in the trusted bucket.
#
# Credentials passed on the cmdline should be accepted on every coco platform.
testcase_coco_creds_cmdline() {
assert_in "systemd.set_credential=$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_ID:$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_VALUE" "$(</proc/cmdline)"
assert_eq "$(systemd-creds --system cat "$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_ID")" "$COCO_CRED_CMDLINE_VALUE"
}
# fw_cfg is unmeasured on every platform and import_credentials_qemu() drops it for any confidential
# guest, so this applies to SNP and TDX alike.
testcase_coco_creds_hostile_fwcfg() {
local fwcfg_dir=/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name
[[ -d "$fwcfg_dir" ]] || modprobe qemu_fw_cfg || :
assert_ok test -e "$fwcfg_dir/opt/io.systemd.credentials/$COCO_CRED_FWCFG_ID/raw"
_coco_assert_cred_absent "$COCO_CRED_FWCFG_ID"
}
# SNP only: the SMBIOS tables are not covered by the launch measurement, so
# import_credentials_smbios() bails out. Under TDX they are measured into RTMR0 and thus trusted.
testcase_coco_creds_hostile_snp_smbios() {
_coco_assert_smbios_injected "$COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_ID"
_coco_assert_cred_absent "$COCO_CRED_SMBIOS_ID"
}
# A host-injected SMBIOS string must not displace a credential the measured channel already
# delivered: boot-channel credentials import first and names are never overwritten, on every
# platform. The probe proves the overwrite was attempted.
testcase_coco_creds_hostile_shadow() {
_coco_assert_smbios_injected "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID"
assert_eq "$(systemd-creds --system cat "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_ID")" "$COCO_CRED_TRUSTED_VALUE"
}
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
# shellcheck shell=bash
#
# Host-side helpers for the confidential computing integration test (TEST-94-COCO).
# Sourced by the TEST-94-COCO.sh driver.
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" -ef "$0" ]]; then
echo >&2 "This file should not be executed directly"
exit 1
fi
# shellcheck source=test/units/TEST-94-COCO/fixtures.sh
. "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")/fixtures.sh"
# Exit status the guest test runner reports on success (its unit's SuccessActionExitStatus=). vmspawn
# forwards the guest PID1's EXIT_STATUS over the vsock notify socket and exits with it.
_COCO_GUEST_PASS=123
# vsock port the host listens on for the guest's per-check result records, distinct from vmspawn's own
# (kernel-assigned) notify port. The host binds CID_ANY:PORT; the guest connects to CID 2 (host):PORT.
_COCO_RESULT_PORT=4321
# _coco_guest_unit COCO_TYPE UNITS_DIR TESTCASES
# Emit the one-shot unit that runs the guest test runner: passes the coco type, result port and
# the requested checks via the environment, and relays the aggregate verdict via
# SuccessAction/EXIT_STATUS.
_coco_guest_unit() {
local coco_type="${1:?}" units_dir="${2:?}" testcases="${3:?}"
cat <<EOF
[Unit]
Description=coco guest self-check
After=basic.target
SuccessAction=exit
SuccessActionExitStatus=$_COCO_GUEST_PASS
FailureAction=exit
FailureActionExitStatus=1
[Service]
Type=oneshot
Environment=COCO_TYPE=$coco_type
Environment=COCO_RESULT_PORT=$_COCO_RESULT_PORT
Environment="COCO_TESTCASES=$testcases"
ExecStart=$units_dir/guest-test-runner.sh
EOF
}
# _coco_guest_dropin
# Emit the multi-user.target drop-in that pulls the guest self-check unit into the boot.
_coco_guest_dropin() {
cat <<EOF
[Unit]
Wants=$COCO_GUEST_UNIT
After=$COCO_GUEST_UNIT
EOF
}
# vmspawn_boot_coco MACHINE COCO_TYPE WORKDIR TESTCASES [systemd-vmspawn args...]
# Boot a confidential guest with systemd-vmspawn, running the coco guest test runner. TESTCASES is the
# space-separated list of guest checks (testcase_coco_* names without the prefix).
# The caller supplies the boot-path-specific launch args — --image/--linux/--initrd and the guest
# kernel command line — plus any extra flags via "$@", so each per-boot-path scenario
# stays configurable. Per-check records shipped by the guest are collected over a vsock
# socket into WORKDIR/results and echoed; returns 0 iff the guest reported the success
# aggregate, otherwise dumps the console.
vmspawn_boot_coco() {
local machine="${1:?}" coco_type="${2:?}" workdir="${3:?}" testcases="${4:?}"
shift 4
local units_dir results console guest_unit guest_dropin rc=0 listener_pid=""
units_dir="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
results="$workdir/results"
console="$workdir/console.log"
: >"$results"
guest_unit="$(_coco_guest_unit "$coco_type" "$units_dir" "$testcases")"
guest_dropin="$(_coco_guest_dropin)"
# Collect the per-check records the guest ships over vsock (single connection, guest closes when
# done). Best-effort: the aggregate exit status below is the authoritative pass/fail, so a vsock
# hiccup only costs the per-check breakdown, never the verdict.
socat -u "VSOCK-LISTEN:$_COCO_RESULT_PORT" "OPEN:$results,creat" &
listener_pid=$!
timeout -k 30 300 systemd-vmspawn \
--machine="$machine" \
--coco="$coco_type" \
--ram=1G \
--ephemeral \
--tpm=no \
--console=read-only \
--set-credential="systemd.extra-unit.$COCO_GUEST_UNIT:$guest_unit" \
--set-credential="systemd.unit-dropin.multi-user.target:$guest_dropin" \
"$@" \
2>&1 | tee "$console" || rc="${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
kill "$listener_pid" 2>/dev/null || :
wait "$listener_pid" 2>/dev/null || :
if [[ -s "$results" ]]; then
echo "coco guest per-check results:"
cat "$results"
fi
if [[ "$rc" -eq 124 || "$rc" -eq 137 ]]; then
echo "systemd-vmspawn was killed by timeout (exit $rc)" >&2
cat "$console" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$rc" -ne "$_COCO_GUEST_PASS" ]]; then
echo "coco guest test runner failed: vmspawn exit $rc (expected $_COCO_GUEST_PASS)" >&2
cat "$console" >&2
return 1
fi
return 0
}
+2
View File
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ _show_summary() {(
_record_subtest_rc() { _record_subtest_rc() {
local subtest="${1:?}" rc="${2:?}" local subtest="${1:?}" rc="${2:?}"
subtest="${subtest##*/}"
if [[ $rc -eq $_SUBTEST_SKIP_RC ]]; then if [[ $rc -eq $_SUBTEST_SKIP_RC ]]; then
echo "Subtest $subtest skipped" echo "Subtest $subtest skipped"
_SKIPPED_TESTS+=("$subtest") _SKIPPED_TESTS+=("$subtest")